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A CRITIQUE OF ALFRED SCHUTZ'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL
SOCILOGY

by

Eva Rosemary Learmonth

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Critique of Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Sociology" submitted by Eva Rosemary Learmonth in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in Sociology of Education.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a philosophical and theoretical analysis of the Phenomenological Sociology of Alfred Schutz. It sets out to investigate: (1) the logistics and consistency of phenomenology as a philosophical theory of the world; (2) Schutz's phenomenologically and pragmatically biased argument concerning the mind and body, "consciousness" and behavior, and his related account of "things", social and material, as consisting and referring to human activity; and (3) his distinction between social and natural science premised upon the phenomenological dichotomy, mind and physical world.

The findings are as follows: (1) Phenomenology as a philosophy is to a large extent illogical due to the fact that it presupposes that questions of how one knows govern what one knows. Logically, questions of how one knows assume that one knows. (2) Schutz's theory of action, portraying the mind as being composed of happenings and occurrences which cause events in the outer world, bodily movements, supposes a mind-body dichotomy which is dispelled if man's interrelationship with nature is incorporated into the theoretical framework. Related to this discussion, it is shown that Schutz's referral of social and material "things" to human action and, hence, motives, ignores the "things" themselves. (3) Schutz's argument calling for different methods, because qualitatively different subject matter, in the social and natural sciences is dispensed with, first, because it is based on unjustifiable phenomenological assumptions, and second, because the life sciences can now provide social science with a more adequate paradigm than the physical

sciences.

This thesis is designed to play a part in the process of criticizing and invalidating phenomenology on its own grounds. Having accomplished this, other approaches to understanding phenomenology are suggested such as linking Schutz's theory to the social, economic, political conditions of his time, and relating the current popularity of phenomenology to modern conditions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Footnotes	6
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHENOMENOLOGY	7
A. The Philosophy	7
B. Criticisms	17
Footnotes	26
III. SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF ACTION AND BEHAVIOR	28
A. Behavior	29
B. Action and Conduct	34
C. Rational Action	39
D. Social 'Things' and Human Activities	49
Footnotes	55
IV. SCHUTZ's METHODOLOGY FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE	57
A. Common-sense, Social Science and Natural Science	57
B. The Method of Social Science	64
Footnotes	72
V. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND REMARKS	74
A. Summary	74
B. Phenomenology as Ideology	75
C. Sociology and the Appeal of Phenomenology	77
D. Educators and Phenomenological Sociology	78
Footnotes	81

BIBLIOGRAPHY	82
APPENDIX 1. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON ALFRED SCHUTZ	86
Footnotes	88

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One striking feature of sociology today is that schools of thought proliferate; superficially phenomenology appears to be just another offspring. Surprisingly though, distinctly different schools of thought claim to have phenomenological roots. One reason for such a variety of phenomenological sociologies is that phenomenology qua a philosophical theory is intended to end where both social and natural science begins. It is first an investigation into the conventional methods and problems of these sciences in order to lay bare their socially produced presuppositions which are hidden in their concepts. Second, from the ensuing discussion, methods, problems, concepts, etc. are not discarded, but instead are elaborated such that scientists acknowledge and take responsibility for their "taken for granted" assumptions. In this way certain scientific concepts are clarified, yet differing schools of social and scientific thought remain undaunted. It is therefore as difficult to write a thesis on "Phenomenology" as it is on "Sociology".

This thesis, then, is concerned solely with the work of Alfred Schutz, a pioneer in synthesizing phenomenology and the social sciences, and a man who is often cited as a primary source and inspiration by many contemporary phenomenological sociologists. Although this is a critical examination of Schutz's work, it is not meant as an attack on the man himself. It is intended to question some of his central notions which themselves are social products, and to sift out other ideas which are valid. Like all phenomenological sociologists (for reasons given above)

his writing can be categorized into a school of thought. Schutz himself often acknowledges his debt to Max Weber while treating Weber's ideas in the proper phenomenological manner, i.e., clarification of some of his central concepts such as "action" and "rational action". This gives Weber a phenomenological, hence philosophical, justification.

Schutz states in Collected Papers: Vol. I that the "primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social reality."¹ The term "social reality" is to be understood

. . . as the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men connected with them in manifold relations of interaction.²

The social scientist is an obtainer of the knowledge "inside men's heads". That is, he is not a priori to posit any thought patterns that the subjects may have. Instead of simply taking a "social reality" for granted, the social scientist is to self-consciously vacate his own mind in order to "objectively" observe and report the subjects' actions. The aim of such observation is to discover, via interpretation, the subjects' motives, thoughts, patterns of thinking, world-view--in Schutz's terms, "social reality"--upon which the subjects' action is based. Schutz employs other terms to indicate the subjects' "social reality" such as "common-sense world" or the "natural attitude" and it is within these cognitive realms that the social scientist finds the meaningful structure of the world of daily life. Maurice Natanson states in the "Introduction" of Collected Papers: Vol. I that "it might be said that the philosophy of Alfred Schutz articulates a single intuition, the discovery in full depth of the presuppositions, structure and signification of the common-sense world."³

Such may be the results of Schutz's theoretical pursuits, but the impetus for his work was the development of a polemic against logical positivism and behaviorism. Schutz whole-heartedly supported the subjective point of view, and reproached any position which he thought ignored the "intellect" of one's fellow man. Paradoxically, the intent of the phenomenological method is to raise the scientist above the natural attitude, away from the intellect of one's fellow man, resulting in an esoteric point of view. However, it must be kept in mind that much of Schutz's work is in defense of the first person standpoint.

Early in Volume I of his Collected Papers he states:

In the following pages we take the position that the social sciences have to deal with human conduct and its common-sense interpretation in the social reality, involving the analysis of whole systems of projects and motives, of relevances and constructs . . . Such an analysis refers by necessity to the subjective interpretation of the action and its settings in terms of the actor.⁴

Threaded throughout, and hence unifying, this thesis is the argument, against Schutz, that the exclusive use of the subjective, cognitive, interpretation of human behavior is inadequate for a full understanding (1) of why people behave as they do, and (2) of societies. To be sure Schutz does deal with the problem of objective interpretation, but it is viewed within the context of the question "How can social scientists, being 'subjects' themselves, objectively interpret the subjective motives of the behavior of the 'Other'?" It is the contention of this thesis that this 'subjective-objective' problem is an inevitable consequence of phenomenology as a philosophical theory. Therefore this thesis is largely concerned with an analysis of phenomenology as being the root of some of Schutz's sociological problems.

This thesis, in its conception, began with a general uneasiness

with the sort of approach, supposedly a phenomenological approach, to education being taken by Michael Young and others in his book Knowledge and Control.⁵ Tracing the roots of their positions I found myself confronted with Alfred Schutz and phenomenology. My discomfort still not dispelled, nay magnified, I was forced to dig still further into the realm of philosophy and to locate the position of phenomenology relative to other philosophies. This thesis, then represents only the first step in the attempt to work back from philosophy to sociology, to sociology of education, to Michael Young and company. However the result of such a process has been the negation of those sociologies, of education or whatever, which claim to be phenomenological.

There are several approaches which could be taken in critiquing Schutz, some of these are briefly outlined in the concluding chapter. The approach taken in the body of this work is a philosophical and theoretical analysis of what Schutz says. Such is prior to investigating: (1) how his ideas came to be; (2) how those ideas should be applied to the study of societies, generally, or education, religion, the family, etc., specifically; or (3) how those ideas concur and enhance the dominant existing notions of a particular socio-economic-political order. These questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. The task which this thesis sets out to accomplish is to analyse: (1) the logistics of phenomenology as a philosophical theory of the world; (2) Schutz's phenomenologically and pragmatically biased argument concerning mind and body, motives and behavior, and his related description of "things", social and material, as composed of human action and behavior; and (3) his distinction between social science and natural science being premised on the phenomenological distinction and relationship between the

human mind and the physical world. Such is undertaken in Chapters II, III and IV respectively. A brief summation of the results of this investigation can be found at the beginning of the concluding chapter (V).

The technique employed in this argument is to discuss the many facets of Schutz's work interspersed with questions and criticisms designed to expose their limitations and undermine their consistency on logical and factual ground.⁶ Following this, I will briefly attempt, in the conclusion, to salvage those ideas which can be incorporated into another sociological framework which may render Schutz's work explicable and, in part, explicating.⁷

Footnotes - Introduction

¹ Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers: the Problem of Social Reality, Vol. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, p. 53.

² Ibid., (Italics not in the original.)

³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴ Ibid., p. 34.

⁵ Michael Young, (ed.). Knowledge and Control. London: Collier - MacMillan, 1971.

⁶ For examples of the sort of technique here, see: John Hospers' Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice - Hall, Inc., 1967; Alastair MacIntyre's Against the Self Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy. New York: Schocken Books, 1971, especially chapters 18 - 21; Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1949; and Henri Lefebvre's Dialectical Materialism. London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1968.

⁷ It will become clear in this thesis that the sociological framework used to analyse the sociological aspects of Schutz's theory is generally that of Karl Marx. It will be argued that Marx's theory leads to a better understanding of "consciousness", and is also able to account for Schutz's theory. See the works of Henri Lefebvre, Istvan Meszaros and Karl Marx listed in the Bibliography.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHENOMENOLOGY

A. The Philosophy

As sociologists search for alternatives to mainly Parsonian and Marxian social theory, the word "Phenomenology" is more and more creeping into their vocabulary. It is sometimes questionable how much modern day sociologists know about phenomenological philosophy, but Schutz was well versed in the subject. Schutz was especially interested in Edmund Husserl, a German philosopher who gave the phenomenological movement its most persuasive formulation; yet he also refers to the writings of Sartre, Scheler, Bergson, James and Dewey. Schutz's technique for coming to and substantiating certain philosophical understandings is to find points of agreement between these philosophers which are then contextually bound together through the works of Husserl. Such a technique is not surprising since Husserl argues that what he calls 'phenomenology' has always been done by philosophers anyhow.¹

The question arises when documenting one philosopher's interpretation of another whether that interpretation is correct. The question is an important one; for if Schutz's interpretation of Husserl is correct, then my criticisms can be extended to include Husserl. Furthermore, I may then apply some of my general criticisms of Phenomenology specifically to Schutz's version of Phenomenology. It appears that Husserl held Schutz in high regard. In a letter Husserl wrote that Schutz is "one of the few who have penetrated to the core of the meaning of my life's work, access to which is unfortunately so diffic-

ult, and who promises to continue it as representative of the genuine Philosophia perennis which alone can be the future of philosophy.²

There are two aspects of phenomenology which are relevant to the sociological enterprise: the first concerns the phenomenological point-of-view which the sociologist is advised to adopt; the second concerns the subject matter to which the sociologist applies his newly acquired phenomenological outlook. (such a dichotomy is in itself phenomenological in that it separates the perceiving from the perceived.) We will be concerned in this chapter with the first aspect which will involve the description and criticism of the basic principles of phenomenology. At this first level it is the aim of the sociologist qua philosopher to reflect upon himself as a man living naively among other men. The sociologist, thus raised to the level of self-consciousness, aware of the principles of his own consciousness, removes himself from his consciousness and applies these principles to other men still living naively. Keeping such a general procedure in mind, let us begin the examination of Phenomenology.

Husserl, like some other philosophers, wanted to discover 'Absolute Knowledge', that is, what man can know to be absolutely certain. Already several things become clear about phenomenology. (1) It is epistemological, that is, it deals with our (man's) knowledge of things rather than with things themselves. (2) 'Absolute Knowledge' is in some way different from 'knowledge'. It is a difference about certainty: 'knowledge' may be hypothetical or doubtful, 'Absolute Knowledge' is not. To arrive at 'Absolute Knowledge' Husserl suggests that we employ Descarte's method of subjecting all 'knowledge' to doubt, that which can not be doubted is 'Absolute'. Phenomenologists talk of

"suspending belief", or "putting the world in brackets", or "performing the phenomenological reduction" rather than 'doubting'. Let us now partake in this reduction.

We begin, as do phenomenologists, by suspending belief in the physical world. Such a doubt is, according to phenomenologists, possible. Where idealists may deny the existence of the physical world, phenomenologists say that we can't be certain of its existence. Our knowledge of the existence of the physical world is not a piece of 'Absolute Knowledge'. The phenomenologist comes to doubt the existence of the physical world by examining how we came to know it. All our knowledge of the external world comes entirely from our senses. We sensually experience the 'world'. This means that we have sensations of color, shape, taste, smell, texture, etc. What we have sensations of are called sense-data. (Neither Husserl or Schutz use the terms sensation or sense-data. Instead they use the words Noesis and Noema to distinguish between the act of perceiving, sensation, and the perceived, sense-data.) However, sense-data is not necessarily an accurate representation of the thing in the external world because the number of varying sets of sense-data which could represent the object is infinite. A coin, for example, from one angle may appear elliptical, from another angle the same coin may appear round, and for every position in between the coin appears slightly different. From which angle do we perceive a true representation of the coin? Furthermore, our eyes and our other senses may be playing tricks on us. The elliptical brown spot in front of our eyes may be a hallucination. In any case, what I can not doubt is that I do see an elliptical brown spot, that is, I have sensation of sense-data. I can not be mistaken about the

sense-data that I sense, but I can be mistaken in claiming that sense-data have correlates in the real physical world. To the phenomenologist, then, sense-data are pieces of 'absolute knowledge' and it is found in the 'eye of the beholder'.

There is yet another distinction to be made: there is a difference between having a sensation of sense-data and knowing that sense-data. I have sensations of sense-data but I have learned to recognize that data as a 'spot of brown' or as a 'table'. This distinction is perhaps the more basic in that it can accordingly be claimed that we have learned to call sense-data 'physical objects'. Hence, when a person says "I know there are physical objects," he is really saying that "I have learned to call a certain class of sense-data physical objects." Having a sensation of sense-data is passive: defining the sense-data is to actively impose a learned frame of reference upon the sense-data. Sense-data is not 'a table', 'a physical object', etc., it is in itself just data.

In phenomenology this 'learned frame of reference' or, as phenomenologists call it, 'the natural attitude' is 'bracketed', reducing consciousness to 'pure consciousness', i.e. the sense-data themselves. Having found 'pure consciousness', sense-data and 'Absolute Knowledge' the phenomenologist now turns sociologist and returns to examine the content and constitution of the bracketed natural attitude. The employment of the phenomenological method is necessary for the sociologist in indicating "the relativity of this real life-world and of any imaginable life-world, to the transcendental subjectivity which alone has the ontic sense of absolute being.³ All that is bracketed, all that is doubtable is a product of the mind, the 'transcendental

subjectivity'.

To interpret all this (the natural attitude) by showing the intentional accomplishments of the transcendental subjectivity makes up the enormous area of work of constitutive phenomenology. It is thus a true science of mind, and claims to be a method in fact the only method which seriously means to be a radical explanation of the world through mind.⁴

The question now arises: 'What is the content of the 'transcendental subjectivity'?; or, 'What remains after the completion of the reduction?' Schutz answers:

What remains after the performance of the transcendental reduction is nothing less than the universe of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its integrity, with all its activities and with all its cogitations and experience (both terms being used in the broadest--the Cartesian--sense, which includes not only perceptions, conceptions, judgments, but also acts of will, feelings, dreams, fantasies, etc.)⁵

To elaborate: What remains after the reduction is everything that was there before the reduction, only it is thought of and expressed differently. Citing Schutz's example, in the natural attitude I see a tree. I think that it is a corporeal thing. Then I perform the reduction; I doubt the physical existence of the tree; I put it in brackets. Thereafter the tree remains outside the brackets but is thought of as 'the tree as I have perceived it', or the phenomenon 'tree as-it-appears-to-me'. The tree may or may not exist in the bracketed outer world but now its physical existence is irrelevant.

Thus the whole world is preserved within the reduced sphere in so far, but only in so far, as it is the intentional correlate of my conscious life--with the radical modification however that these intentional objects are no longer the things of the outer world as they exist and as they really are, but the phenomena as they appear to me.

Hence, I have taken responsibility for what I see.

What is perceived by me is influenced by two things: (1) the

act of perceiving (the sensation), and (2) the perceived (the thought-object, the intentional object). Schutz states: "There are modifications of the intentional object which are due to the activities of the mind...., and others which originate within the intentional object itself...."⁷ The second instance means that after I have stopped looking at the tree, I have retained an image in my mind of the tree-as-it-appears-to-me. Yet, next time the perceived 'tree' appears on my visual screen, it appears to have changed. I now have a second image of 'tree' which becomes connected to the first. My present retained image of 'tree' is based upon past sense datum and it also anticipates future 'tree-ish' sense datum.

Activities of the mind which render modifications of the intentional object are due mainly to one's purpose. For instance, if I intend to use the 'tree-as-it-appears-to-me' for shelter from the rain, I will attend to its rain-sheltering qualities--broadness and density of the leaves--as-they-appear-to-me. Hence my conception of 'tree' is again enlarged.

So far I have talked about "so-called real objects" but what about spoken and written words, or the concept of 'phenomenology', or "any of the so-called social and cultural objects which are meaningful and can at any time be made intentional objects of our cognitions."⁸ These are called by Schutz ideal objects. I can talk and think about 'phenomenology' or about the metaphorical meaning of the word 'pig' in the same way that I can talk about the 'sense-data pig'. The former are examples of ideal objects; the latter is an example of a 'so called real object'; yet all are examples of potential intentional objects.

It is the peculiarity of intentional objects that they are founded upon so-called 'real' objects of the outer

world and that they can be communicated only by signs and symbols which are in turn perceptible things, such as sound waves of the spoken word or printed letters.

Enough has now been said generally about phenomenology to facilitate some more precise distinctions in developing phenomenological concepts. It seems of major importance (although not to Schutz) to attempt to clarify what is meant by thought object, intentional object, sense-data and ideal-objects. As intimated, Schutz uses these terms very vaguely, often substituting one for the other, or using the same term in two seemingly contradictory senses. Following is the sense that I have made of these words:

1. 'Sense-data' is a word that I have employed because most other phenomenologists do and in my view is essential to an understanding of phenomenology. It is used to denote that which we can be certain of with regard to the existence of the external world. With respect to the sense of sight, those un-identified, unclassified, patches and blurs of color and shape on my visual screen are sense-data and are all that man can ever visually know of the external world--if there is one. Schutz uses the terms 'sense-presentations' or 'sense object' to denote what I have called sense-data.

2. Sense-data are distinguished from thought-objects by Schutz as follows:

Even the thing perceived in everyday life is more than a simple sense presentation. It is a thought object, a construct of a highly complicated nature, involving not only particular forms of time successions in order to construe it as an object of one single sense, say sight, and of space relations in order to construe it as a sense object of several senses, say of sight and touch, but also a contribution of imagination of hypothetical sense presentations in order to complete it.¹⁰

Such a description harkens back to the earlier distinction between the

act of perceiving and the perceived. A thought-object is simply the perceived. It is a particular sense-datum differentiated and defined according to its own characteristics. However, neither the perceived, nor the perceived characteristics exist in the natural attitude without the act of perceiving. Thus, a thought object does not exist independent of an intentional object.

3. In the natural attitude only intentional objects exist. Sense-data are classified according to the characteristics selected by the mind as being relevant. There are no sense-data in-themselves, i.e. thought objects; there are only thought-objects as defined and created by the mind projecting itself onto sense-data. The mind selects from an infinite number of sense-data and characteristics those which are relevant to its purpose-at-hand and classifies or types them accordingly. Consciousness is always intentional, it is always conscious of something it defined itself. Hence, consciousness is active and the raison d'etre of all things known to man.

It is not as if the object itself can be understood apart from the act that intends it. In Husserl's terminology, it is the intentional act that constitutes the object.¹¹ Without the act there would be no object.

In passing it should here be noted that this act of consciousness is "meaning-endowing" or "signifying" and is the prime interest of the social phenomenologist. Schutz says:

The phenomenologist, we may say, does not have to do with the objects themselves, he is interested in their meaning, as it is constituted by the activities of our mind.¹²

4. Thinking of thought-objects as sensual content and intentional objects as form (process, activity), we notice that the sense-datum labelled 'tree' has both. On the other hand, the number 5 has no particular sensual or empirical content, it is only form, what Schutz

calls an 'ideal object', what other phenomenologists may call an 'essence', or what other philosophers call "concepts" and "propositions". Solomon elaborates:

Concepts and propositions are what give meaning to all experience, what make it possible for us to see objects. For every particular object we see, we also intuit an essence. Every time I see a dog, I see that it is a dog.... Essences are what make a thing "what it is". The essence of a dog is what makes it a dog; the essence of the number 5 is what makes 'it' the number 5. 13

It seems, then, that every thought-object has an essence making it an intentional object, but every intentional object is not always a thought-object.

To elaborate: Essence or 'ideal object' is that essential characteristic that makes a dog a 'dog'. 'Four legs' is an essential 'dog' characteristic. "All dogs have four legs," is a proposition about essences but it is not necessarily true--some dogs may have lost one leg and still pass for dogs. "All triangles enclose space with three angles" is a less debatable proposition and is an example of what phenomenologists call essentially (necessarily) true--other philosophers claim it is analytically true, true by definition. The difference between the two propositions is that (1) the second proposition is true for all triangles that can be produced now, in the future or were produced in the past, whereas the first proposition, as indicated, may not always be true; and (2) 'dogs' are constituted by both thought-objects based on sense-data (content) and intentional consciousness (form), whereas triangles are constituted only by an intentional act of consciousness making the essential content the form.

The concept of "phenomenon" is obviously important to phenomenologists. In Solomon's words it "represents both something that is

'in' experience and something that is the object itself."¹⁴ In our terms here, "object" is to be translated into 'thought-object' making the concept of "phenomenon" equatable with the concept of "intentional object". Doing Phenomenology implores that one describe one's world as just phenomena without the presuming that it is either real or imagined, or that it is shared or private.

Because Phenomenologists doubt the 'reality' of the world, they have had to devise a new theory of meaning and language. It is the common understanding that some words have referents in the real world. They are conventional sounds or graphics which people produce and understand to identify certain objects in the real world. This is what we usually mean when we say that "a word has meaning". The word 'cat' stands for, or means the real physical object cat. But because the phenomenologist doubts the existence of the physical object 'cat', what can he mean when he talks about the meaning of the word 'cat'? What is the referent? Within the phenomenological frame of reference the referent is the intentional object in (1) the mind of the speaker, and (2) the mind of the listener.

There are, of course, other kinds of words which are not commonly thought of to have referents in the real world. The word 'God', for example, is understood by many as something other, or more than, a physical object. Defining 'God', thereby, means something other than pointing to a physical object: we might define 'God' by describing the ideas that people have of Him. Such a definition is very close to what the phenomenologists expect in a definition of 'cat', for it is the signifying act of consciousness that they believe gives meaning, not the physical object or even the thought-object itself.

On page 8 of this chapter we spoke of Husserl's main desire to find Absolute Knowledge, or indubitable truth. It is suggested that I think, feel, perceive, etc. The world outside myself can be doubted and its very existence questioned, but that "I think there is a world" can not. Self-knowledge, then, seems equatable with Absolute Knowledge and is the point at which scientists should begin their enterprise. For the social scientist this principle of indubitable self-knowledge is extended to include the fellow-man's reports of himself. The result of such, is the compilation and synthesis of several descriptions of self into a universal whole which depicts the "social reality" of a particular group. The most difficult and most important task facing the sociologist is describing and recording others' descriptions of themselves accurately and without theoretical bias.

Husserl demands: Describe phenomena, don't super-impose theories on them and don't populate an imaginary "behind-the-phenomena" stage with unknowable "things-in-themselves". The description of phenomena must be one that is devoid of theory, devoid of prejudice or presupposition.¹⁵

And Schutz implores that the attitude of the social scientist be "that of a mere disinterested observer of the social world."

By resolving to adopt the disinterested attitude of a scientific observer--in our language, by establishing the life-plan for scientific work--the social scientist detaches himself from his biographical situation within the social world.¹⁶

Having just now briefly fitted phenomenology into the sociological enterprise, let us return to take a more critical look at the logistics of phenomenology.

B. Criticisms

1. My first criticism of phenomenology involves the distinction

between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. It is suggested by Phenomenologists that in order to obtain 'absolute knowledge' we must doubt what we know by persistently asking how we know. Hence, we doubt the reality of that tree by questioning our sensory apparatus whereby we have come to know that tree. The result is that questions of 'how we know' presides over 'what we know' when logically, in fact, questions concerning 'how we know something' assume 'that we know something'. By questioning 'how we know' we are only questioning our methods of verifying 'that something'. Hokers elaborates:

Phenomenalism...provides a good account of how we verify the existence and characteristics of physical objects: we can verify that physical objects exist only because we experience sense-data. This is not denied. But we should not confuse what something is with how we know it: we should not confuse the evidence for p with p's meaning.... Phenomenalism is, in a way, simply the verifiability theory of meaning applied to the special problem of perception....¹⁷

It is true that principles of space and time limit my perceiving that tree from all possible angles and at all times; hence, I can not know the whole tree nor whether the tree exists when it is outside my perceptual sphere. But does that fact alone make statements assuming the real existence of that tree meaningless, or phenomenologically speaking, irrelevant? That is, just because we can't verify for all times and places the existence of that tree, then we should construct a philosophy on this minor yet logical possibility. Gilbert Ryle sees

...no grounds for denying universally that we can have knowledge by perception of physical things and events. Husserl's arguments on this point...seem to me only to show that particular perceptions don't tell the whole truth about their objects. But if they can tell us the truth and nothing but the truth¹⁸, no conclusions damaging to the world seem to arise....

It is perhaps misleading to imply that phenomenologists treat

propositions about physical things as irrelevant and therefore discard them. What is meant is that the existence of the physical world becomes irrelevant when it is translated (reduced) into a phenomenological statement. The statement "The flowers are on the table" is a statement about the flowers, although it also says something about the table. Phenomenologically speaking the statement is "It appears to me that the flowers (as-they-appear-to-me) seem to be on the table (as-it-appears-to-me)". An observer has been added to provide evidence for, hence verification of, the existence of the flowers, the table, and their relationship. To the phenomenologist the two statements are the same on the grounds that the second is implicit in the first. The critic disagrees on the grounds that the second is about the observer upon which the flowers and table are predicated. The existence of the flowers comes and goes with the presence and absence of the observer, the verifier. When the observer is absent, his verification of the flowers and trees can only be hypothetical, for example "If I go into the room, then I will see the flowers." On this point Hoppers cites Isaiah Berlin:

Categorical propositions about material objects are replaced by unfulfilled "counter-factual" hypothetical propositions about observers, and what troubles the plain man is the thought that if the hypotheticals are unfulfilled, if no observers were in fact observing, then if the phenomenalist analysis is correct, there was--in a sense-datum sense--nothing at all.... And this seems empirically a different picture of the world from that which he started by believing; and in no sense merely a description of the old picture though in different words....¹⁹

2. My second criticism of Phenomenology as a philosophy centers around the question "How much proof is required by phenomenologists to accept the existence of physical objects?"

Within the phenomenological frame of reference the existence of the physical is treated as just an hypothesis to account for sense-data.

However, it is an hypothesis of the sort that can never be confirmed: it will always remain just an hypothesis. The fact that we constantly interact with the "so-called" physical world, that we constantly and accurately predict its behavior, etc., is not considered evidence for its existence; for this evidence is itself doubtful due to socialized methodological expectations and procedures. Evidence, to the phenomenologist, "is not a hidden quality inherent in a specific kind of experience, but the possibility of referring derived experiences to an originary one."²⁰ Evidence for the existence of something is explained away by examining what it is for someone to give evidence. There are two different levels of discourse occurring here; the first is of the metaphysical order (how things are) and the second, the phenomenological, is of the epistemological order (how things are known). Epistemologists insist on translating statements of 'how things are' into 'how things are known' and such a translation, as Hoppers indicates, is as absurd as translating sentences about electrons into sentences about instrument panels or cloud chambers.

Yet persistently epistemologists argue that "'it all goes back to sense-data': there is no belief about the existence or properties of physical objects that must not find its verification in sense-experience...."²¹ Returning to our main point: How much verification do phenomenologists and epistemologists want? They will admit that we constantly behave as if the physical did exist, but is not this very fact the strongest empirical argument we have for the existence of the physical world?

The whole problem vanishes, in Schutz's case at least, with the realization that the argument is about where to draw the line between

what we know in the weak sense (believe) and what we know in the strong, absolute sense. Schutz uses phenomenology with its epistemological logic to argue that we can only know, absolutely, ourselves and that all other statements about an external world are doubtful. I am here attempting to show that phenomenology is itself riddled with contradictions, confusions and unanswerable questions in order to suggest that we can, and in fact do, know, absolutely, that a world exists outside ourselves. Basicly the phenomenological distinction between 'knowledge' and 'absolute knowledge' is a stipulative one for which there are no unquestionable grounds. Given that they have made a stipulative distinction, I can follow suit, if I wish, and stipulate my own distinction. I could say, for example, that we have absolute knowledge of those things which respond in a predictable way to my action upon them. So far I have only argued that those things that phenomenologists subsume under 'knowledge' can, from another point of view, be known 'absolutely'. Later I will argue that what they subsume under absolute knowledge, i.e., self-knowledge, can be doubted.

3. There is one other confusion in phenomenology that I wish to elaborate--which centres around the fact that phenomenology is a language of appearances. Schutz discusses the phenomenological attitude in the reduced frame of mind:

I am no longer attaching to this perception, however, any judgment whether this chair is really an existing object in the outer world. It is not the corporeal thing "chair" to which my perception refers, but the intentional object of my preserved perception is "the chair as I have perceived it", the phenomenon "chair as it appears to me", which may or may not have an equivalent in the bracketed outer world.²²

The common language of appearance is not sense-data language, because sense-data is what appears, whereas common appearance language

makes no existential claims. We ordinarily use the word 'appear' when the conditions of perception are not favorable, when the room is dark for instance. In such a case we would say that there appears to be a chair; but using sense-data language we would say first that the sense-data, itself, is the appearance of a chair, and at a further level 'it appears that there is the appearance of a chair'. Logically there is either chair or not-chair. However, under such conditions, I can not say either that this is chair sense-data or not-chair sense-data because, for sense-data, what is is what appears. Hosphers puts it more succinctly stating: "a sense-datum is what it appears, and can have no properties it does not appear to have; our knowledge of its properties is exhaustive at the moment we have the experience. So we can't say of sense-data, 'It really does have an E-shape or it doesn't, but I can't be sure which".²³ Obscurity, then, can not figure in a phenomenological framework and neither, therefore, does interpretation of the obscure.

Confusion over sense-data language (which includes 'thought-object', 'intentional object' and 'ideal object') arises when we ask: "What is the existential status of these sense-data?"; "Do they exist in the same way coins exist?"; or "Can a moving sense-datum cause another sense-datum to topple?". Sense-data statements are supposedly about sense-data which exist in one's mind like a sort of dream. If we say that sense-data exist in the same way we believe physical objects exist, then can we not extend the argument and say that we have sense-data of sense-data? Phenomenologists become caught in a quandry if they suggest that sense-data exist because we can then doubt the existence of sense-data. Consequently it becomes as absurd for the phenomenologist to make statements about sense-data as it is for them

to make statements about physical objects. Hence statements about intentional-objects, thought-objects, etc. being based upon the assumed existence of sense-data are also absurd.

The problem of sense-data is, according to Hospers, based upon faulty logic. "Sense-datum philosophers," he says, "have argued as follows:

1. I see the coin.
2. The coin is round.
3. The coin appears elliptical to me.

Therefore, 4. I see an elliptical sense-datum."²⁴

There is nothing in the first three premises to suggest that I see "an elliptical sense-datum". Logically I can not infer a second object from the premises given.

There is only a round something, the coin, which appears elliptical. There is no reason why something should not have one property while appearing to have another: the distant trees look purplish....There are, to be sure, ways of appearing that an object has: but "modes of appearance are clues to the nature of what exists"; they are only evidence - providing material that we use to discover the nature of existent things.²⁵

To bind oneself to phenomenology is to make the world beyond one's self inaccessible.

In summation, then, "Where do we stand?" The translation (reduction) thesis has been dispensed with on the grounds that it was not a translation at all but a way of foisting the observer, the 'verifier', on to the scene. The definition of, and the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'absolute knowledge' has been shown to be stipulative by indicating the selectivity of phenomenologists in accepting evidence for what is known. And thirdly we have questioned the sense-datum language

whereby appearances become objects in themselves. All in all, Phenomenology raises more questions than it answers, and for me it would be a bad bargain to trade my "natural attitude" for a phenomenological one. However, I do not want to discard Phenomenology completely for it does have a place in our common way of approaching the world.

C. Phenomenology in its Place

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'phenomenon' as follows:

1. A thing that appears, or is perceived or observed; applied chiefly to a fact or occurrence, the cause of which is in question.
2. Philos. That of which the senses or mind directly takes note; an immediate object of perception.
3. A highly exceptional or unaccountable fact or occurrence....

'Phenomenology' is defined as:

- a. The science of phenomena as distinct from that of being (ontology)
- b. That division of any science which describes and classifies its phenomena.

There is then a particular kind of undertaking denoted by 'phenomenology' which existing concordantly can contribute to other kinds of scientific undertaking without displacing them. Schutz however suggests just such a displacement in statements such as:

But the basic concept of phenomenology leads to an entirely new interpretation of logic.²⁶

The importance of this method should not be underestimated. It leads to an entirely new theory of induction and association, and also opens the way to a scientific ontology.²⁷

Undoubtedly Phenomenologists have, or should have, expertise in observation, description and classification of what is immediately present but this expertise ends there: they have no expertise in explanation, i.e. going beyond what is immediately presented to the senses.

True some phenomenologists do attempt explanation but such explanations fall prey to the 'knowing how' and 'knowing what' problem indicated earlier. Phenomenologists, according to the common-sense definition of the word, should limit themselves to descriptions of yet unexplained facts and occurrences and to devising a procedure to ensure accuracy in this endeavor. Such an activity would complement the rest of the scientific enterprise.

Footnotes - Chapter II

¹ See Gilbert Ryle 'Phenomenology' in Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Phenomenology and Existentialism. New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1972.

² Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. X.

³ Ibid., p. 122.

⁴ Ibid., p. 123.

⁵ Ibid., p. 105.

⁶ Ibid., p. 106.

⁷ Ibid., p. 107.

⁸ Ibid., p. 110.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹ Robert C. Solomon (ed.), 'General Introduction', Op. cit., p. 25.

¹² Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 115.

¹³ Robert C. Solomon, Op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁶ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 36-37.

¹⁷ John Hospers, Op. cit., p. 553.

¹⁸ Gilbert Ryle, 'Phenomenology' in Op. cit., p. 225.

¹⁹ John Hospers, Op. cit., p. 552.

²⁰ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 109.

²¹ John Hospers, Op. cit., p. 555.

²² Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 106.

²³ John Hospers, Op. cit., p. 557.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 561.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 109.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 115.

(Note: For references not cited here see Chapter I footnotes.)

CHAPTER III

SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF ACTION AND BEHAVIOR

This chapter deals with two assumptions inherent in Schutz's phenomenological approach to sociology. The first is that all human actions are dictated by individual, intentional, motivational consciousness; and second, that all social phenomena can be reduced to individual human activity. Schutz says:

I can not understand a social thing without reducing it to the human activity which has created it, and beyond it, without referring this human activity to the motives out of which it springs.¹

We begin with discussion and criticism of what Schutz outlines as the relationship between action and consciousness.

Seminal to the following discussion is what is revealed after the completion of the phenomenological reduction or after I have reduced "the universe of my conscious life to my own transcendental sphere, to my concrete being as a monad."

Within this reduced world-phenomenon, one object is distinguished from all others. I call it my body, and it is distinguished by the fact that I can control it in action and that I attribute sensorial fields to it in conformity with my experience. If I reduce other human beings in a similar way, I get peculiar corporealities; if I reduce myself as a human being, I get "my body" and "my mind" or me as a psycho-physical unity, and in it my personal "I" which functions in my body, or which acts on and endures the exterior world by means of it.²

Several things are notable in this passage: 1) the mind and body are two parts of a unit, a "me", 2) within which a personal "I" operates. 3) The body mediates between the "I" and the exterior world, yet 4)

the "I" controls the body in action. Embodied in the above quote and, as I hope to show, in Schutz's whole theory of action is what Gilbert Ryle refers to as Descartes' myth. I will, therefore, be able to level some of Ryle's criticisms of the myth contained in his book The Concept of Mind to Schutz's theory.

A. Behavior

There is a general class of bodily movements which Schutz calls 'behavior', and within this class are the sub-classes of 'action' and 'conduct', which refer to the everyday notions of voluntary and involuntary behavior. Further, within the sub-class of 'action' there is distinguished a more complex type of action called 'rational action'.

In outlining the concept of 'behavior' Schutz distinguishes it from other bodily movements, sensations and experiences.

A pain, for instance, is not generally called behavior. Nor would I be said to be behaving if someone else lifted my arm and then let it drop. But the attitudes I assume in either of these cases are called behavior. I may fight the pain, suppress it, or abandon myself to it. I may submit or resist when someone manipulates my arm.³

Experiences of the first sort are 'passive' whereas experiences of the second sort--behaviors-- are 'active', that is, they involve a spontaneous 'attitudinal Act'. The distinction drawn here is of the same order as the distinction drawn in the first chapter between 'the sensed' and 'having a sensation', only here we are concerned with my bodily movements and there we were concerned with the physical world. 'Having a sensation' of bodily movement or of an object of the external world is necessarily a predicate of 'I', or, in other words, a spontaneous Act of intentional consciousness, an "Ego-Act". The objectivity of the bodily

movement is thus constituted precisely in this Ego-Act. Hence, Schutz comes to define 'behavior' as "an experience of consciousness that be-stows meaning through spontaneous Activity."⁴

There is an element of time involved in the transition of bodily movements becoming defined as 'behavior'. Movements as they occur are "perceived" as primordial activity which are preserved in memory. Only from a later vantage point is the "beam of reflection" directed at that movement identifying it as my (past) behavior. "Phenomenal experience is, therefore, never of oneself behaving, only of having behaved."⁵ The recognition, or the taking of the attitude, that the behavior occurred in the past is enough to distinguish prephenomenal experiences from phenomenal ones. Riding with this transitory distinction is the fact that my phenomenal behavior refers back to "my primal impression of spontaneous Activity." It must be remembered that the investigator is concerned with the 'meaning' of behavior which, due to phenomenological prescriptions, must be defined subjectively. The following allows Schutz to sum up his position in his own words.

Behavior, then, consists of a series of experiences which are distinguished from all other experiences by a primordial intentionality of spontaneous Activity which remains the same in all intentional modifications. Now it becomes clear what we meant when we said that behavior is merely experiences looked at in a certain light, that is, referred back to the Activity which originally produced them. The "meaning" of experiences is nothing more, then, than that frame of interpretation which sees them as behavior. So in the case of behavior, also, it turns out that only what is already over and done with has meaning. The prephenomenal experience of activity is, therefore, not meaningful. Only that experience which is reflectively perceived in the form of spontaneous Activity has meaning.⁶

There are several questions concerning this definition of 'behavior' which need to be posed. The first concerns what Schutz refers

to as "spontaneous Activity". I assume that what Schutz means by "spontaneous" is that "Activity" is not caused by external forces but by inner forces alone. The infant then "spontaneously" moves his arm; the forces which caused the arm to move are inner forces. But what of the brightly colored object that the infant was groping for? What about the mother who praises the child's attempt to grasp the object, and thereby directs the child's attention towards his own behavior? Is there not a dialectical process between the child and the outside world which figures in distinguishing one's own behavior from the action of others? To Schutz, it seems not: the primal recognition that "I did it" is supposedly "spontaneous". By proposing that behavior is driven by inner, hence hidden, forces, Schutz makes it impossible for the observer to impute cause to another's movement. It is the actor alone who is privileged to define what is "behavior" and to impute cause. Furthermore, because "behavior" is an attitude assumed by the 'behave-er' it is not even visible to the observer, that is, to the observer it is nothing more than movement. What is defined as "behavior" by the producer is only movement to the observer. This leads us to the tricky question of "objective and subjective meaning structures" which will be dealt with later.

Now, there is another set of questions to be asked which stem from the central question "How many parts of the 'mind' are there?" It seems that there are three (3) parts: experience, consciousness, and Activity. In functioning together at the primal level of "behavior" Activity produces bodily movement, the experience, which is felt, or experienced, by consciousness which in turn endows the experience with meaning. In addition, acts of consciousness, e.g. judgment, are also experienced

and endowed with meaning in the same way bodily movements are. By examining these 'mental acts' the objectivity of consciousness is established.

What distinguishes the objectivity of consciousness, which is constituted in original Activity and is therefore a case of behavior, from all other experiences of consciousness and makes it "meaning-endowing" in Husserl's sense, becomes intelligible only under one condition, namely, that one apply the distinctions explained above between the constituting Act and the constituting objectivity to the sphere of spontaneous Activity.⁷

It seems then that consciousness plays two roles: the first is to endow body movements with meaning by referring to the Activity which produced it; and second to endow its own 'acts' with meaning by similarly, referring them to the Activity which produced them, thus making itself an object of itself. The possibility of infinite regress is evident: Is not "meaning-endowing" a 'mental act' in itself which therefore also requires meaning-endowment, and then this act also requires further meaning-endowment....? It is necessary for Schutz in calling for subjectivity in the social sciences to show that 'the mind' is aware of itself, or is in some way 'self-illuminating', but this 'self-illumination' is infinitely regressive. As well, Schutz's definition of behavior implies that the subject is conscious of, or knows that "frame of interpretation that sees them as behavior". What is at stake here is the subjects' knowledge of self which is supposedly infallible, for to know something is to know that something is the case. Yet, according to Gilbert Ryle, people are notorious for failing to recognize their frame of mind.

They mistakenly suppose themselves to know things which are actually false; they deceive themselves about their own motives; they are surprised to notice the clock stopping ticking, without their having, as they think, been aware that it had been ticking; they do not know that they are

dreaming when they are dreaming, and sometimes they are not sure that they are not dreaming, when they are awake; and they deny, in good faith, that they are irritated or excited, when they are flustered in one or other of those ways. If consciousness was what it is described as being, it would be logically impossible for such failures and mistakes in recognition to take place.⁸

For a sociologist, then, to allow the subject to distinguish between behavior and non-behavior and to describe the meaning of the behavior, is to allow the subjects' own failures and mistakes to pass for correct data.

Before proceeding to Schutz's definition of "action" there is one final point to be discussed. The method employed by Schutz in arriving at a description of "the mind" and its interaction with the physical world is one of introspection, the phenomenological reduction. By implication, other theorists should be able to employ the same technique and arrive at similar conclusions. However, such is not the case: philosophers and psychologists who have claimed to engage in introspection of one form or another have come up with differing reports of the workings of the mind.

They were not unnaturally embarrassed to discover that the empirical facts reported by one psychologist sometimes conflicted with those reported by another. They reproached one another, often justly, with having professed to find by introspection just those mental phenomena which their preconceived theories had led them to expect to find. There still occur disputes which should be finally soluble by introspection, if the joint theories of inner life and inner perception were true.⁹

On this account, then, Schutz's descriptions of the workings of the mind are suspect. It has been suggested earlier that Schutz's obsession with 'subjectivity' may have led him to adopt phenomenology in order to prove that people do have privileged access to the workings of their minds and therefore their reports of these happenings must be given priority.

It is possible, as well, that the phenomenological reduction led Schutz, by necessity, to his findings: strangely, though, this is the same sort of criticism which he himself directs at non-phenomenologists and even at the laity regarding their 'naive belief' in the existence of the physical world. We could give Schutz the benefit of doubt on these points, and concede that perhaps Schutz is unique; perhaps he really does define his own behavior; perhaps there are three parts of his mind that interact in the manner described above; but is that any reason to ascribe the same occurrences to the minds of others? Unfortunately, Schutz thinks so and his reasons for such are discussed under the topic of 'Inter-subjectivity' which we will deal with later.

Keeping the above points in mind, we now look at Schutz definitions of 'action' and 'conduct'.

B. Action and Conduct

"Action" is conscious or voluntary behavior whereas 'conduct' is 'reactive' in character and includes such things as reflexes.¹⁰ All behavior when reflected upon turns out to be future oriented. The assumption of the behavioral-attitude "I moved my arm" carries with it the protention "I can do it again." Furthermore, when I reflect upon a past behavior I can see that it was, at least in a minor way, goal directed; "I moved my arm in-order-to stretch a cramped muscle." The completion of "having stretched that muscle" is an example of what Schutz calls "the Act", or "that which is to be realized through the action."¹¹ Having 'the Act' in view prior to behavior is what distinguishes 'action' from 'conduct'. The most complete pronouncement of Schutz's thesis is this:

An action is conscious in the sense that, before we carry it out, we have a picture in our mind of what we are going to do. This is the "projected act". Then, as we proceed to action, we are either continuously holding the picture before our inner eye (retention), or we are from time to time recalling it to mind (reproduction). The total experience of action is a very complex one, consisting of experiences of the activity as it occurs, various kinds of attention to that activity, retention of the projected act, reproduction of the projected act, and so on. This "map consulting" is what we are referring to when we call the action conscious. Behavior without the map or picture is unconscious.¹²

The meaning of any action is precisely this "map", the "projected"; which varies depending upon the point of time from which it is observed. Before the action has begun the "projected act" is phantasied in the future perfect tense as already executed; as the action takes place the phantasied act is replaced with lived experiences and a discrepancy arises between what was originally intended and what actually resulted. Thus, the meaning of action changes in internal time-consciousness.

This is also true of conduct, unconscious behavior, for although conduct is not proceeded by 'map-making' it can be reflected upon after its occurrence and its meaning ascertained.

The 'projected act' or the meaning of an action is, as well, a 'motive' for the action. To be more precise it is the "in-order-to" motive of action which together with the "because-motive" forms the simplest complex of meaning through which an actor interprets his own action. The "in-order-to" motive needs to be clearly distinguished from the "because" motive.

The former refers to the future and is identical with the object or purpose for the realization of which the action itself is a means....The latter refers to the past and may be called its reason or cause....¹³

The means-end relationship between the action and the in-order-to motive,

the projected act, implies that the action is determined by the in-order-to motive which is, in turn, determined by the because motive. The because motive is ascertained, given sufficient pragmatic reasons, by the actor via a special act of reflection directed towards his biographical situation; whereas the in-order-to motive is ascertained via a process of future-oriented deliberation which takes the biographical situation, and hence, the because motive, into account. In order, then, to understand the actions of another, one must have knowledge of his motives rendering his action meaningful.

A perplexing situation arises from this theory of action and conduct (unconscious behavior). Conduct which is unreflected upon is meaningless, yet people very often do conduct themselves in aimless, therefore meaningless, manners. According to Schutz though, a person will reflect upon his conduct and reveal the because and in-order-to motives for his behavior, if given sufficient pragmatic reasons to do so. What are these pragmatic reasons and what influence do they exert on the persons motives? Let us imagine a situation in which a sociologist is trying to understand a subject's conduct. The sociologist must prompt the subject to reflect upon his conduct by asking him questions, etc. The subject co-operates and performs an act of reflection directed towards his past conduct. However, as Schutz himself remarks, "The 'meaning' of experiences is nothing more, then, than that frame of interpretation which sees them as behavior": in this case "that frame of interpretation" is the sociologist's, not the subject's. The subject ascribed no meaning to his own aimless behavior until the sociologist imposed his own frame of interpretation upon the conduct via his questions. Result: the sociologist is studying himself. But Schutz

has a solution: the sociologist constructs ideal actors, or puppets, and endows them with an ideal consciousness, the content of which is obtained from 'real' actors yet functions in accordance with Schutz's theory. The inadequacies of this solution will be dealt with later: for now it suffices that the point has been made.

There is another problem with Schutz's theory of action which stems not from the practice following from the theory but with the theory itself. Schutz assumes that the occurrence of an overt action is preceded by an occurrence in the mind. Whether or not the actor is conscious of that mental occurrence distinguishes action from conduct. The occurrence Schutz assumes may have happened in the past or may be anticipated; hence, the because and in-order-to motive. The difficulty with this theory is that it precludes behavior which is the result of a person's disposition. To explain a piece of behavior by saying "he is nervous, irritable or bitter" does not figure in Schutz's theory even though such explanations are commonly satisfactory. Being irritable, for example, is not some occurrence that 'I' experience, rather it is a general tendency to act in certain ways. Actions resulting from being irritable are not goal directed, nor are they usually explained by "because motives" having to do with biographical situations (although sometimes some irritable moods may be explained by recourse to lack of sleep, nausea, etc.). As well, therefore, such "motives" and goals can not even be ascertained by performing an act of reflection from a later vantage point, and so a behavioral occurrence resulting from an irritable disposition can not be subsumed under Schutz's categories of "action" or "conduct".

It may be that the source of this neglect is to be found in

what Schutz thinks it is to 'explain' an occurrence. Gilbert Ryle points out that there are two senses in which an occurrence is said to be explained.¹⁴ The first sense, which he labels the causal sense, is illustrated by saying that the glass broke because it was struck by a stone. The second sense is when we give a 'reason' for the glass breaking by saying that glass is brittle. Both statements provide explanations, but neither statement by itself provides a complete explanation of an overt occurrence, although the second type is superior in generality. When I state that "glass is brittle" I am providing a reason for the glass shattering not only when it is hit by a stone but also for its shattering when the earth trembles or when a violin produces a certain pitch. That something has a certain disposition, property, character, or quality is both a consequence of and substantiated by social or physical occurrences, but the disposition is not itself an occurrence. Dispositional statements are, hence more law-like and can account for several occurrences.

The same can be said when we are accounting for human behavior. "Behavior" according to Schutz is explainable, describable and definable in terms of a series of mental occurrences of which the subject is aware. The 'I' or the 'Ego' experiences these external or mental occurrences. Hence, a person's socially produced disposition which, for example, we might ordinarily describe as 'vain' is translated into an occurrence which is experienced by the 'Ego'. The motive, then, in Schutz's terms, for the overt occurrence of, say, 'admiring one's self in the mirror' is "in-order-to" satisfy the covert mental occurrence of 'vanity'. Schutz not only employs explanations of the first type but he also translates explanations of the second type into those of the first. What he loses in this translation is the law-like propositions that are inherent in

dispositional explanations. Such law-like propositions have great predictive value, in that, if I describe someone as vain to you, you can expect that person to behave in numerous other ways which seek admiration. There is no need to assume that the vain person is himself experiencing pangs or urges of vanity prior to his behavior.

Schutz, as noted previously, rules out emotions and dispositions as reasons for behavior; even unconscious behavior, conduct, is driven by the "because" and "in-order-to" motives which are only temporarily hidden from the actor. What Schutz's theory does deal with is achievement oriented behavior. To be sure this type of behavior does exist but not to the exclusion of other types.

C. Rational Action

Within that class of behavior which Schutz called "action" there is a set which is called "rational action" and another set of action called "social action", or to be more precise "rational social action". Schutz argues that the distinguishing characteristic of the former is the element of choice whereas the latter is preformed according to institutionalized standards which routinize the action.

Schutz's argument begins with a discussion of what Weber defined as rational action.

Rational action, however, presupposes that the actor has clear and distinct insight into the ends, the means and the secondary results, which "involves rational consideration of the alternative means to the end; of the relations of the end to other prospective results of employment of any given means, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends. Determination of action, either in affectual or traditional terms is thus incompatible with this type." (inclusive quote Weber's)¹⁵

This definition, along with Talcott Parsons' given below, is essent-

ially accepted by Schutz.

Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the conditions of the situation, and by the means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science.¹⁶

Schutz's argument with Parsons and Weber is over the extent to which the category of "rational action" is determinative of the actions of the ordinary man living his everyday life. Schutz takes the stand that "rational action" as described above is too complex to be a type of action on the everyday scene, and it should therefore be conceived as ideally rational action. Everyday action is routinized, that is, it is standardized and mechanized to the point that the relationship between the series of means and ends disappears from consciousness. Action of this sort follows from a typified sort of knowledge which Schutz calls "cook book knowledge".¹⁷ The rationality inherent in this type of action is "explained" as follows:

We may explain the rationality of human interaction by the fact that both actors orient their actions on certain standards which are socially approved as rules of conduct by the in-group to which they belong: norms, mores of good behavior, manners, the organizational framework provided for this particular form of division of labor, the rules of the chess game, etc. But neither the origin nor the import of the socially approved standard is "rationally" understood.¹⁸

There are, then, two levels of "rationality": one has to do with rational action or interaction which is rule-oriented; the other deals with rational understanding and deliberation which results in rational action. This latter type of action Schutz refers to as ideal rational action which is necessarily preceded by rational choice. Rational choice itself is present "only if the actor had sufficient knowledge of the end to be realized as well as of the different means apt

to succeed."¹⁹ Hence rational action is defined "as an action with known intermediate goals."²⁰

The distinction between the two types of action is completely subjective. From the vantage point of an observer, an action may be seen as routine, yet may be highly calculated according to the actor. On the other hand, however, we can not assume that all action is the result of decisive choice:

It is erroneous to assume that consciousness of such alternatives and therefore choice is necessarily given before every human action and that in consequence all acting involves deliberation and preference.²¹

Some actions, concedes Schutz, on the everyday scene are indeed calculated but the clearness and distinctness of the conceived means and ends are only appropriate to the actor's practical interests in a specific act. What Schutz wants to delimit by the term "ideal rationality" is a system of thinking which considers series of alternative means and ends, and chooses those which are most apt to successfully achieve a larger, more general goal. This ideal of rationality...

...is not and cannot be a peculiar feature of everyday thought, nor can it, therefore be a methodological principle of the interpretation of human acts in daily life.²²

The system of rational action has its native place...

...at the theoretical level of scientific observation of (the social world), and it is here that it finds its field of methodological application.²³

I do not here intend to quibble over Schutz's stipulative definitions of "ideally rational" and "socially rational" actions, but two general criticisms should be noted. First, the above distinction is not clearly demarcated by Schutz, for some actors on the everyday scene do systematically and deliberately organize their lives around principles, or, if you like, philosophies which are not geared to prac-

tical interest and in fact sometimes run contrary to practical interest. And, on the other hand, that system of ideal rational thought which is supposedly the prerogative of scientific observers of the social world can, in certain instances be viewed as a body of rules which are adhered to in theoretical practice.

Secondly, it is rather suspect that Schutz, and other academics, sometimes seem to characterize theorizing as a way of thinking that is much more complex, complicated and, therefore, superior to the thinking engaged in by the ordinary common-sense man. A group of social theorists talking about the thinking of the social world is neither more nor less systematic or complicated than a group of farmers talking about their crops. The practice of social theorizing is indeed a different type of practice than farming but the former is in no way more "systematically rational" than the latter. It is understandably tempting for those who make their living by thinking to believe that they are the 'gurus' of thinking. We all learn how to think but we don't all learn how to farm.

The most important argument that I have against Schutz's discussion of "rational action" concerns his idea that everyday "rational action" is rule-bound. According to Schutz these rules form a system of knowledge of typical sequences and relations which Schutz calls "cook-book knowledge". These rules are regularly applied with success to routine matters in the same way that the recipe for making apple pie is all we need to make an apple pie.²⁴ (Incidentally, and perhaps to Schutz's surprise, one also needs flour, sugar, apples, etc.)

These recipes for everyday living are related to Schutz's "because" and "in-order-to" motives. First they are related to the "be-

"cause" motive in that recipes are derived from past experiences. A rule or recipe is extrapolated from several past experiences where adherence to the rule rendered a successful achievement. Secondly, the rule is used as an efficient means of obtaining a projected end; hence, "in-order-to" bring about an end or goal with minimum effort and avoiding undesirable consequences I can employ this rule. The rule, then, once tested can be used to further my practical interest. Furthermore, these recipes and rules are not my private affair, they are accepted and applied by my fellow-man and as such enable me to interpret their actions. These rules are thus correlated to the cultural pattern. Schutz claims:

Thus it is the function of the cultural pattern to eliminate troublesome inquiries by offering ready-made directions for use, to replace truth, hard to attain by comfortable truisms, and to substitute the self-explanatory for the questionable.²⁵

In the following analysis of Schutz's thesis I hope to argue:

- (1) that there are types of behavior that are neither instances of "recipe following" nor instances of "ideally rational action"; (2) that some behavior may, in a sense, be said to be rule-bound but reference to the rule does not provide the ultimate explanation for the behavior; (3) that the "functioning" of the cultural pattern is for some hardly as altruistic as Schutz implies.

1. It is here worth remembering what was noted earlier, i.e., Schutz talks almost exclusively of achievement-oriented behavior--yet there are many types of behavior which are not achievement oriented. When I sincerely cry, for instance, I may not be attempting to achieve any goal although I may be motivated by an external occurrence which indirectly makes me cry this time but perhaps not another time. Schutz

however can refuse to deal with behavior that is emotional or dispositional on the grounds of his distinction between "conduct" and "action". He claims to be discussing the rationality of human action and interaction. Accepting such a stipulative distinction the critic may point out narrowness of this category or he may reject the distinction alternatively arguing that a prerequisite for achievement-oriented action is the achievement-oriented disposition of the actor. The latter criticism would deny Schutz's category of action by subsuming all behavior under "conduct" or "unconscious behavior". In any case it is not difficult to find examples of recurrent social behavior that are not rule or recipe bound that we might call 'acts of the heart' or dispositional acts. This is, of course, not to deny that there are 'acts of the heart' such as some instances of murder which do break social rules.

At this point some confusion resulting from Schutz's terminology should be cleared up. We can think of 'rules' for life in a moral sense, for example "Do not kill except in times of war.", "Do not steal.", "Do not gamble." The major problem with the idea of these kinds of rules serving as a guide to some kinds of behavior is that many moral rules contradict one another. Hospers illustrates as follows:

If one is never to cause needless or avoidable suffering to others, presumably one should put incurably ill people to sleep (forever) painlessly, with their consent; yet this violates the rule that forbids taking human life.²⁶

Then there are also rules which regulate specific types of behavior; such as traffic regulations, or laws governing economic activity, some of which follow from moral rules. These rules, or laws, are formally constituted and offence usually results in formal sanctions. This formality however does not result in consistency in the law itself, in application of the law, or in sanctions. These laws can tell us how

to do certain things but they do not tell us what to do nor when to adhere to one law rather than another.

Within large bureaucratic institutions there are formal rules. I suppose the word 'recipe' could be applicable here, for performing tasks and achieving ends. There is as well a body of informal rules some of which are the antithesis of the formal rules and may result in the non-performance of tasks and the non-achievement of ends. Doing "good" work for example may formally be the course to the top but "golfing with the boys" may be the informal (and more successful) way.

Schutz, unfortunately, neither defines nor gives concrete examples of what he means by rules or recipes: he simply states, implicitly and explicitly, that people living their everyday lives abide by a system of knowledge ("cook-book knowledge") that is sufficient for mastering life and this knowledge is something other than scientifically rational. The point of the above discussion is to indicate that there are certain recurring acts which have no corresponding recipe and if there are some such acts then perhaps all acts are of this type. To generalize from the particular in this manner would be to commit no greater or less an error than the one committed by Schutz. However, Schutz has indicated (see discussion on action and conduct, page 39) that rules can be spelled out in terms of "in-order-to" and "because" motives providing the action with meaning and reason or cause. But to say that I brush my teeth every morning because it is a habit, is to refer to the activity of brushing my teeth not the recalling of a recipe or rule. Hence, the reason or cause and meaning of the activity is the activity itself not the recipe.²⁷

Next I hope to have implied, at least, that there are a great

many rules, laws, recipes, etc. that one could be following when exhibiting certain behavior. In the following quotation Schutz outlines the supposed relationship between the recipe the actor has in mind, the observed action, and the result of the action.

The recipe works, on the one hand, as a precept for actions and thus serves as a scheme of expression: whoever wants to obtain a certain result has to proceed as indicated by the recipe provided for this purpose. On the other hand, the recipe serves as a scheme of interpretation: whoever proceeds as indicated by a specific recipe is supposed to intend the correlated result.²⁸

The social scientist is the interpreter (hence, interpretive sociology) of the everyday activities of man and as such he must ask... "what happens in the mind of an individual actor whose act has led to the phenomenon in question."²⁹

There are several things wrong with this approach. First, of course, Schutz has not satisfactorily proven that behavior is governed by a "recipe" be it individual or social, yet he suggests that the sociologist assume such in correlating observed behavior with unobservable recipes. Secondly, even if recipes do govern behavior an observer can not impute from the behavior itself what recipe is being followed. There is not a one-to-one correlation between recipes and behavior. To use a cookery example: we may observe the cook making rhubarb pie yet the recipe he is following is for apple pie. Thirdly, following a recipe does not guarantee a specific result and therefore the result can not be evidence for the recipe. There are other factors besides personal intentions which influence the result. Such a theory as Schutz's tends to individualize a person's successes and failures by regarding them in terms of personal, albeit socially inbued, intentions. The explanation for failure to find work after following certain procedures would, per-

haps, be not because there are no jobs but because the person did not intend to find work. Following a certain procedure or recipe may be necessary to achieving a certain end but it is not always sufficient.

2. Men have always attempted to explain the regularities that they observe in nature. In modern times the study of nature has been divided into physics, astronomy, biology, sociology, etc. Social scientists then attempt to explain the regularities in human behavior. That rules regulate or govern human behavior is only one explanation which I have tried to indicate is inadequate, because only partial. But behavioral regularities still remain, and behavior, in some qualified instances, is still rule-bound. It is my contention that there are more ultimate laws of human behavior which can account for the rule-bound type of behavior, the rule itself, and other types of behavior.

Hospers states:

We can explain an event by means of laws, and we can often explain the law by means of other laws or theories, and sometimes these in turn by other laws and theories. But sooner or later, our knowledge comes to a stop: we cannot explain the law or theory by means of anything else.³⁰

To "explain" the "rationality of human interaction by the fact that both actors orient their actions on certain standards which are socially approved as rules of conduct..."³¹ is not to evoke an ultimate law: it can be explained in terms of something else rendering it a special case. Likewise to explain behavior solely in terms of dispositions (as it might be implied that I have done, although my point was only to present an alternative to the motive and rule-bound theories) is to explain a particular case of behavior.

Let us get directly to the point: Schutz explains behavior as being caused by an act of consciousness (recalling a rule, making a

rational choice, habitually following a recipe, etc.), which in some instances may be correct, but consciousness itself can be explained. Karl Marx outlines the explanation in the following famous quotation:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society--the real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.³²

A more general law underlying the above is that man's consciousness grows out of man's interaction with nature. Going beyond Schutz's claim that we "can not understand a tool without knowing the purpose for which it was designed..."³³ is the claim that we can not understand either the tool or the purpose of the designer without knowing nature, the stage of development of production, and the relations of production.

Unless material production itself is understood in its specific historical form, it is impossible to grasp the characteristics of the intellectual production which corresponds to it or the reciprocal action between the two.³⁴

3. Much of Schutz's work centres around a description of how the "cultural pattern" presents itself to the common sense of everyday man, and how it is then selectively assimilated according to his practical interest. The term "cultural pattern of group life" is used by Schutz to designate "all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociolo-

gists of our time, characterize--if not constitute--any social group at a given moment in its history."³⁵ This "cultural pattern" then is a sort of "collective consciousness" which enters into a reciprocal relationship with "individual consciousness", with "practical interest" serving as a mediating factor. Recognizing "practical interest" as a form of 'interest', not 'practice', we notice that "consciousness" is portrayed as evolving on its own; it is divorced from nature and productive activity (industry, work, labour, etc.). Such a divorce bars Schutz from noticing the complementary and contradictory relationship between ideas (rules, recipes) and practice, and, as well, it relagates his explanation of cultural change to one of self-generation. Hence it is understandable the Schutz comes to see the "function" of the "cultural pattern" on its own terms as simplifying the thinking of common-sense man. Recall:

Thus it is the function of the cultural pattern to eliminate troublesome inquiries by offering ready-made directions for use, to replace truth hard to attain by comfortable truisms,³⁶ and to substitute the self-explanatory for the questionable.

That it is the function of the "cultural pattern" to justify or legitimize existing practices, or that it is the function of the "cultural pattern" (religion for example) to mystify or misrepresent existing practices, are notions acceptable to many sociologists but foreign to Schutz's analysis. Similarly the sociological concepts of "false consciousness" and ideology are precluded.

D. Social 'Things' and Human Activities

By now, it is hoped, we see that human behavior can not exhaustively be reduced to the motives, the intentions of the actor. We have yet to show that "social things" can not always be reduced to the "human

activity which has created it." Under the category of "cultural objects" (I assume that this term indicates the same things as "social things") Schutz lumps "tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, social institutions, etc."³⁷ What is already peculiar is that Schutz includes "tools" as a cultural object thus construing it as being entirely dependent upon the activities of man for its existence. This is, of course, partially true, but the existence of the tool is also partially due to the material existence of such things as wood, metal, fire, water, etc. This may seem a rather mundane objection but it serves to illustrate the more serious objection that Schutz identifies the "thing" with the "activity". A product is something more than the labour which produced it and the activities oriented to that product. This may seem very obvious when considering concrete objects such as tools, but can the same objection be applied to more abstract entities such as social institutions? In the following I will argue for the affirmative.

Maurice Mandelbaum in his article entitled 'Societal Facts' states that his aim is

...to show that one cannot understand the actions of human beings as members of a society unless one assumes that there is a group of facts which I shall term 'societal facts' which are as ultimate as are those facts which are 'psychological' in character. In speaking of 'societal facts' I refer to any facts concerning the forms of organization present in a society. In speaking of 'psychological facts' I refer to any facts concerning the thoughts and the actions of specific human beings.³⁸

His argument is not designed to indicate any causal link between 'psychological' and 'societal' facts; he simply contends that "our statements concerning these societal facts are not (wholly) reducible to a conjunction of statements concerning the actions of individuals."³⁹

Mandelbaum employs the example of a member of this society, accompanied

by a stranger, observing and explaining the behavior of a third party who is withdrawing money from a bank. The initial explanation is couched in terms of interpersonal behavior which is unintelligible without references to the roles and status of the various actors. These terms by necessity refer to the form of social organization. The client behaves in a certain manner precisely because any person in the teller's cage is assumed to be the teller. The role of 'teller' refers to the social institution of banks, and banks refer to other terms (exchange, stocks, bonds, legal tender) all of which imply a certain form of social organization and social production. Recognizing the existence of certain "societal facts" induces many sociologists to study and explain forms and changes of social organizations from which more debates arise. Schutz, however, while recognizing that people do assume roles, treats roles as situational conditions which need to be negotiated and manipulated "in-order-to" achieve desired ends. Hence, Schutz discusses the pragmatic attitude of the client in his impersonal, "They-oriented", dealings with those persons filling social roles who are apprehended by the client as "personal ideal types". He illustrates as follows:

If I drop a letter into the mailbox, I act in the expectation that certain contemporaries of mine (post office employees) will adequately interpret the wish I signified by writing out an address, attaching a stamp, etc., and will in fact carry it out. The expectation which oriented my action was not directed to specific concrete individuals but to the genus of "post office employees".⁴⁰

Via the conjunction, then, of several first-person descriptions of actions and attitudinal expectations, we supposedly can reduce the social institution of the postal system to expectations and activities of individuals. Yet terms such as "mailbox", "post office", "address", "stamp", etc., are not reducible; our understanding of these things de-

pends upon our knowing something about the postal organization and the societal organization and production within which it operates. Such knowledge would enable us to answer a host of questions such as: Why it is that we now have access to this form of postal system rather than, say, the Pony Express?, Why are there 'addresses'?, Why is there such an occupation as 'postal clerk'? , What gives the postal employees the right or authority to handle mail? , etc.

Schutz's inadequate treatment of social organization, society, is perhaps most evident in his discussion of 'The Dimensions of the Social World'.⁴¹ Here he describes the social world from the first-person point of view of the common-sense man who, supposedly, experiences the world as "built around my place in it."⁴² The two dimensions according to which I relate to the 'Other' are space and time. Hence, I enter into (1) 'We-relationships' where I share a substantial amount of both space and time with the 'Other', and come to know the 'Other' intimately as a 'Thou'; (2) 'contemporary relationships' where I come face-to-face with the 'Other' as a "personal ideal type", i.e. fulfilling a certain social role, only briefly sharing space and time, relating only as much as "practical interest" demands and establishing a "They-relation"; (3) relations with predecessors with whom I can 'share' space and time indirectly via records of their acts, but I can not influence them; and (4) relations with successors of whom no experience is possible, we do not directly share space or time, but I may orient my actions towards them. My power and the power of the 'Other' to manipulate and influence is increased the more time and space we share.

We can not debate the fact that we do share space and time with

some people and not with others. But we must ask why we came to consort with some persons and not others? Schutz might retort that the determining factors were my biographical situation coupled with the goals which I choose to pursue. But the critic continues, did not my parents occupy a certain social, occupational and economic position into which I was thrown? And did not the form of social organization and production prevalent at that time define the range of goals open to me, and thus the persons with whom I was to substantially share space and time? Schutz's reply now might be to discuss the social origin, organization and distribution of knowledge and to this we must now turn.

Schutz of course does not deny that we are born into a world wherein our knowledge of it is socially organized and distributed. The organization of the "structure" of our knowledge evolves from the various perspectives, in terms of time, space, and "practical interest", through which each person comes to view the "same" object or fact. From this "structure" knowledge is socially derived and transmitted via friends, parents, teachers, etc.; little knowledge originates within personal experience. Hence, knowledge is somewhat randomly acquired according to interpersonal meetings, co-ordinated by space and time, and in some instances "practical interest" decreasing its randomness.⁴³

It is almost too obvious to note that Schutz has avoided all considerations of objective social organizations (bureaucracies, factories, etc.) whereby men produce their livelihoods and enter into determined and determinant relations. To ignore the positions which groups of people hold within such an objective organization, and to explain institutions, etc., in terms of individual 'goal-seeking', is to make explanations of people's actions and thoughts vacuous; it is to deny

that there is any logic, other than fluke, which explains why people enter into certain relationships, why they entertain certain ideas, why they behave in certain ways rather than in other ways, or why this particular "culture pattern" and not that one. To quote William Mayrl: "Social phenomenology, like all idealism, is an exercise in avoidance."⁴⁴

Footnotes - Chapter III

- ¹ Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers: Studies in Social Theory, Vol. II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 10.
- ² Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 125.
- ³ Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World. North-western University Press, 1967, p. 54.
- ⁴ Ibid., pp. 55-56.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 55.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 57.
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 56.
- ⁸ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 155-156.
- ⁹ Ibid., pp. 158-159.
- ¹⁰ Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 57.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 58. Note: The terms "action" and "behavior" are interchangeable at this level of Schutz's theorizing. The term "conduct" is substituted by the translator for "unconscious behavior".
- ¹² Ibid., p. 63.
- ¹³ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 11.
- ¹⁴ Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 86.
- ¹⁵ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 28.
- ¹⁶ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 64.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 73.
- ¹⁸ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 32.
- ¹⁹ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 79.
- ²⁰ Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 61.
- ²¹ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 78.
- ²² Ibid., p. 79.

- ²³ Ibid., p. 80.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p. 73.
- ²⁵ Ibid., p. 95.
- ²⁶ John Hospers, Op. cit., p. 596.
- ²⁷ See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 106.
- ²⁸ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol III, p. 95.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p. 85.
- ³⁰ John Hospers, Op. cit., p. 247.
- ³¹ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 32.
- ³² Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, I. B. Bottomore (ed.). New York: McGraw - Hill, 1956, p. 51.
- ³³ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 10.
- ³⁴ Karl Marx, Op. cit., p. 82.
- ³⁵ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 92.
- ³⁶ Ibid., p. 95.
- ³⁷ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 10.
- ³⁸ Maurice Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts' in The Philosophy of Social Explanations, Alan Ryan (ed.). London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 107.
- ³⁹ Ibid., p. 110.
- ⁴⁰ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 44.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., p. 20-63.
- ⁴² Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 15.
- ⁴³ See Ibid., pp. 10-15.
- ⁴⁴ William W. Maryl, 'Ethnomethodology: Sociology without Society', in Catalyst, no. 7, winter, 1973, p. 28.

CHAPTER IV

THE METHOD OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS JUSTIFICATION

It is the purpose of this chapter to (1) locate Schutz's position concerning methodological prescriptions for social science within the context of other positions; and (2) to discuss and criticize his position with the hope of arriving at a more tenable position. We begin with a general discussion of "knowledge" leading to a discussion of the differences between natural and social sciences.

A. Common-sense, Social Science and Natural Science

Schutz, in developing his argument for how social scientists should proceed, makes two distinctions: (1) between common-sense and scientific-sense, and (2) between natural science and social science. Germane to the first distinction is the question: What can man know of the external world? His position which he claims to share with Whitehead, William James, Dewey and Bergson is formulated as follows:

All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking there are no such things as facts pure and simple. All facts are from the outset selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case, they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon.¹

Such a position rests upon a confusion which seems to underlie

epistemological and, hence, phenomenological theories, i.e., the failure to make a distinction between what is known and how it is known or communicated. A fact, which is here taken to mean a state-of-affairs,² is something other than a factual statement; that there was an earthquake in Chile is not the same thing as the reporting of that fact. Certainly reports and descriptions of the earthquake do involve constructions but the earthquake itself does not. There is no similarity between an earthquake and the sentence "There was an earthquake"; there is, however, a connection between the two. First, the earthquake itself was of such a magnitude that at least some men were forced to take note of its occurrence because it interferred with their practical activities, even their very survival. In this sense the natural occurrence imposed itself upon some men rendering the supposed selective activities of their minds irrelevant. The second connection is that factual-statements are about the occurrence or state-of-affairs: the very word 'earthquake' points to or stands for the occurrence of an earthquake. Words are instruments used to communicate facts, etc., and as such men may choose to communicate one fact rather than another, but communication of the fact has no bearing on the fact itself.

It may be, however, that Schutz and company would regard the above distinction irrelevant. Their conception of knowledge (as indicated in Chapter II) implies that how one knows presides over what one knows and, therefore, knowing necessarily involves constructions. It is difficult to debate this for it is analytically true. What the critic can do is question their stipulative definition of 'knowledge' by indicating a different sense of 'knowing' which does not involve constructions. To do this let us return to the occurrence of an earth-

quake and two men who are immediately experiencing it. They look at each other with fear in their eyes: they know that the earth is trembling; that their lives are in danger. Such knowledge rests on no constructions.

Another argument against Schutz's postulate that "all knowledge involves constructs" has to do with the development of language. If all knowledge of things involves constructs, then how is it that an infant points to objects and asks for the 'name' of that object? We know that things exist through interaction with them often before we attach a word, or construct to the thing. Part of our knowledge of the world does involve constructs, part does not and there is, of course, reciprocal influence between the two.

Returning to Schutz's argument, the logistics of it are as follows:

- (1) All knowledge involves constructs,
- (2) constructs imply interpretation,

therefore (3) all knowledge is interpretational.

The first premise has been shown to be false, or at best, analytical; it would be superfluous to debate the second for the dismissal of the first is enough to refute the conclusion. A more tenable position for Schutz to hold is that communication of knowledge sometimes (in qualified instances) involves constructs, some of which imply interpretation. (Interpretation is assumed to mean referring to an attitude on the part of the communicator.) Such a position is particular rather than universal and universalizing the particular is one of the major faults of Schutz's theory. In order to progress in our discussion we will assume that the above is his position.

The question now arises: "According to what criteria are 'facts' selected from the universal context?" Schutz replies that viewing knowledge as interpretational does not mean that

...in daily life or in science we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us either for carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedure of thinking called the method of science.³

In Chapter III it was indicated that what Schutz means by "business of living" is activity geared to "practical interest" and as such the focus of Schutz's theory again narrows.⁴ What is important now, however, is the relationship between the constructs of common-sense and scientific constructs. On the one hand, scientific constructs, although rooted in common-sense, "are designed to supersede the constructs of common-sense thought."⁵ On the other hand, refined scientific constructs must remain consistent with common-sense so that (1) they are comprehensible to the common-sense of the everyday actor; and (2) that the scientist does not loose sight of "social reality". The method whereby the scientist develops such constructs will be discussed shortly. To be indicated here is that if social scientists base their constructs on common-sense constructs, and given that constructs refer to "things", then phenomenological sociologists end with accepting, albeit elaborating, common-sense constructs rather than investigating their relationship to "things" This is to ignore what constructs may point to.

The second distinction that Schutz draws in order to justify his prescribed scientific approach to the social world is between social and natural science. Generally he holds that the methodology of the former must differ from that of the latter due to difference in subject matter. Schutz elaborates:

It is up to the natural scientist to determine which sector of the universe of nature, which facts and events therein, and which aspects of such facts and events are topically and interpretationally relevant to their specific purpose. These facts and events are neither preselected nor preinterpreted; they do not reveal intrinsic relevance structures. Relevance is not inherent in nature as such, it is the result of the selective and interpretational activity of man within nature and observing nature. The facts, data, and events with which the natural scientist has to deal are just facts, data, and events within his observational field but this field does not "mean" anything to the molecules, atoms, and electron therein.⁶

On the other hand the social world with which the social scientist has to deal is not essentially structureless.

It has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought objects which determine their behavior, define the goal of their action, the means available for attaining them--in brief, which help them find their bearings within the natural and socio-cultural environment and come to terms with it.⁷

The constructs, then, used by the social scientists are "constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene..."⁸ whereas the constructs of the natural sciences are constructs of the first degree.

Quite clearly, Schutz and others who hold the same position, like Weber, compare social science to particular natural sciences like physics, chemistry, etc., generally those sciences which deal with inanimate objects. There are, however, other branches of natural science, which are more developed and "respectable" today than they were in Schutz's time, such as biology, genetics, physiology, etc., in short, the life sciences. In the past many theorists of human action have been repelled by the (baseless) idea that human behavior may be explained by mechanical laws. In order to prevent such they have devised a theory containing

"laws" which are applicable to "mental" phenomena, and some theorists have zealously gone so far as to claim that all problems are now solvable by their methods.⁹ Schutz, following Husserl, is, in a sense, guilty of such a charge; for it is implicit in the following, and in other unquoted parts of Schutz's work, that the "cultural sciences" should invade the natural sciences.

All sciences, be they related to objects of nature or to so called cultural phenomena, are, for Husserl, a totality of human activities, namely, those of scientists working together. The fact of science itself belongs to that realm of objects which must be clarified by the methods of the cultural sciences....¹⁰

It is not our problem here to debate this (Gilbert Ryle has already cogently done so); we are here concerned with indicating that Schutz's motive for separating natural science from social science is a traditional one. Furthermore, this motive is today, and to a lesser extent in Schutz's day, strengthened by the rise of the 'life sciences' which threaten to encroach upon and destroy the mentalists' doctrines. Within this context then it is not surprising to find Schutz arguing that social and natural sciences are separate in terms of subject matter and, hence, methodology, but equally scientific.

Keeping these considerations in mind we can now turn our attention towards the content of Schutz's argument as quoted at length above. The distinction between the two "sciences" hinges on the meaning of the words "preselected", "preinterpreted", and on the phrase "intrinsic relevance structures". These bespeak of consciousness which distinguishes man from nature, and makes 'man' a class in itself. The debate over the claim that it is consciousness that sets man apart from nature has, indeed, a long history which need not be recounted here. However, in keeping with my thesis, I will argue that the debate is ultimately dis-

solved by recourse to some empirical facts which will be presented in such a way that even Schutz will agree that "consciousness" is not necessarily the prerogative of man. Schutz holds that man apprehends the consciousness of the "Other" by referring his overt actions to the activities of consciousness. Behavior, is hence, evidence for consciousness. Such behavior is necessarily inter-personal or "intersubjective" and entails interlocking motives. For instance, "in-order-to" butter my bun I ask you to please pass the butter--and you do so "because" I asked you. I attribute intellect, consciousness, to you and vice versa. Compare this instance with the following: Later in the evening I am sitting in my chair reading, I turn my head and ask, "Do you want to go for a walk?" My dog perks up his ears, jumps from his chair, goes and gets his leash and waits by the door. (Any dog owner will attest to the fact that this is not a fanciful example.) Many respectable scientific experiments have been performed on animals which indicate "intelligence" of the same type which is often ascribed to man. Employing the criterion of consciousness to distinguish man from nature, hence, results in a distinction of a degree that is hardly substantial enough to warrant a special category for man. The "life sciences" have revealed the intricate complexities of the world of nature have, thus, elevated its status so that man (excepting some theologians) need not fear inclusion.¹¹

As Gilbert Ryle concludes:

The Newtonian system is no longer the sole paradigm of natural science. Man need not be degraded to a machine by being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He might, after all, be a sort of animal, namely a higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that perhaps he is a man.¹²

A summation of what has been argued thus far in this chapter is as follows:

1. Schutz distinguishes common-sense from scientific sense on the grounds that knowledge is interpreted in the two spheres according to different criteria; "business of living" and rules of scientific thought, respectively. Against this I argued that not all knowledge is interpretational thus destroying the premise of Schutz's argument. In Chapter III it was argued that the "business of living" is not the only criterion whereby we interpret some knowledge.
2. The distinction drawn between natural and social science, based on consciousness, is, it has been argued, only a matter of degree due to certain facts about the behavior of nature from which we can infer consciousness in the same way that we can infer consciousness from human behavior. Hence, consciousness can not be a feature used to distinguish social from natural science.

What remains to be done now is to examine Schutz's rules for social scientific thought.

B. The Method of Social Science

Throughout Schutz's work one is constantly reminded that he is arguing for a "subjective" approach to social science. His position is clearly stated as the quotation on page three of this thesis indicates, and as well in the following:

It is this insight of the actor into the dependencies of the motives and goals of his action upon his biographically determined situation which social scientists have in view when speaking of the subjective meaning which the actor "bestows" or "connects with" his action. That

implies that, strictly speaking, the actor and he alone knows what he does, why he does it, and when and where his action starts and ends.¹³

It would be foolhardy for any interlocutor to deny that people do bestow meaning upon their action, for people do rationalize what they do. What is at issue is how should scientists explain both the rationalizations and the actions. Schutz's approach ends with describing the rationalizations by assuming that the rationalizations are the causes of actions, and by assuming the "Thomas theorem": "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."¹⁴ Consider the following:

The Pedi, in South Africa, believe that infection can be cured by eating grain that has been chewed by a cross-eyed child and hung for three days in a gourd shaped like a snake that is suspended from a particular tree that grows near the water. And they are right, because under these conditions the grain grows a mold like Penicillium, with antibiotic properties, but the child's eyes and the gourd's shape and the species of the tree do not necessarily have anything to do with the cure.¹⁵

Schutz and others operating within the bounds of phenomenology and subjective interpretation would not have gotten beyond the child's eyes, the gourd, etc., in short, the belief, which is perhaps one of the reasons why phenomenologists regard so many things as phenomena, i.e. unexplainables. Within phenomenology most things are unexplainable.

But let us return to the subjective interpretation and deal with the problems of (1) how the social scientist with his own "subjective meaning structure", can grasp the "subjective meaning structure" of the actor on the social scene; and (2) how the social scientist can generalize the "subjective meaning structure" in order to predict future behavior.

1. According to Schutz, the social scientist is a disinterested

observer of the social scene. He is first of all an observer because his "motives are not interlocked with those of the observed person or persons; he is 'tuned in' upon them but not they upon him".¹⁶ The social scientist must assume the attitude of "disinterest" in the practical activities of the observed actors.

He is not involved in the observed situation, which is to him not of practical but merely of cognitive interest. It is not the theater of his activities but merely the object of his contemplation. He does not act within it, vitally interested in the outcome of his action, hoping or fearing what their consequences might be but he looks at it with the same detached equanimity with which the natural scientist looks at the occurrences in his laboratory.¹⁷

The social scientist detaches himself from the life world by establishing a "life-plan" of scientific work. Such a resolution implies that the scientist question his taken-for-granted assumptions about the social world and consequently detach himself from his biographically determined situation. This according to Schutz is no easy task but requires extensive philosophical self-preparation in order to eventually unearth the meaning of the social world. The social scientist must first dig into the depths of his own being'.

Here and only here, in the deepest stratum of experience that is accessible to reflection, is to be found the ultimate source of the phenomena of "meaning" (Sinn) and "understanding" (Verstehen). This stratum of experience can only be disclosed in strictly philosophical self-consciousness. Whoever then wishes to analyze the basic concepts of the social sciences must be willing to embark on a laborious philosophical journey for the meaning structure of the social world can only be deduced from the most primitive and general characteristics of consciousness.... [Husserl's] transcendental phenomenology [has] at last made possible the solution to the riddles of meaning-establishment and meaning interpretation.¹⁸

The social scientist is then phenomenologist first and sociologist second. His self-knowledge which is, via the phenomenological reduction, bracketed in his role as scientific observer is subsequently

used as a resource to which he avails himself in order to understand the observed actors and to construe them as typical. The social scientist can do this because, apart from being a scientist, he is also an actor on the social scene, experiencing and acting in the social world intersubjectively. This does seem like a rather strange and pointless maneuver, for if the function of the "laborious philosophical journey" is to detach the social scientist from his biography and social world in-order to observe in equanimity then it seems contradictory to allow the social scientist to use his own experience as a means of interpreting the actions of others. However, what Schutz assumes, and what is part of his conception of intersubjectivity, is that within the depths of consciousness we are all alike. Hence, the social scientist having found his 'inner-self' from which all "meaning" springs can generalize his inner-self and attribute it to the "Other".

There are two attitudes which we all supposedly share. The first is that we all experience "inner duree", "internal time consciousness", briefly, we all grow older. Secondly, although you perceive the world from your angle, "there", and me from mine, "here", I could ideally change places with you making your "there" my "here" and see the same things that you see. Schutz refers to this as the "reciprocity of perspectives".¹⁹ I can, then, hypothetically understand you and vice versa. Thus, the social scientist, as an objective "Other", employing these two attitudes can make the leap from observing the subjects' action as an objective "Other" to attributing the action with a subjective meaning structure which causally precede the action. Furthermore, this leap is based upon the assumption that the act in question is a rational one, that is, it is directed towards a goal and employs the most appropriate

means of achieving that goal.

Critically speaking, we can but iterate briefly some of the points made previously. First knowledge gained introspectively is non-verifiable, and attempts made to verify such knowledge usually fail. Secondly, in few cases does action result from occultish occurrences in the mind. Yet in order to understand, or empathize, with the actor, as Schutz suggests, we must assume that the act is an expression of some sort of occurrent state of consciousness. Thirdly, the assumption that within consciousness we are all alike disregards certain societal and economic relations which pit one person against another, competition, or one group against another, class-conflict. According to Schutz's analysis such "social tensions" are due to the fact that the members have not attained "self-consciousness". In such cases, however, their various perspectives are not interchangeable for their differences are based on something other than spacial arrangements. As well, the fact that we do all grow older is hardly sufficient to induce warring groups to 'put down their guns', nor is it sufficient reason for the social scientist to interpret the actions of others according to his own, albeit bracketed, experience of the social world.

2. To be examined here are Schutz's ideal-types or, as he calls them, "puppets".

[The social scientist] observes certain facts and events within social reality which refer to human action and he constructs typical behavior or course-of-action patterns from what he has observed. Thereupon he co-ordinates to this typical course-of-action patterns models of an ideal actor or actors, whom he imagines as being gifted with consciousness. Yet it is a consciousness restricted so as to contain nothing but the elements relevant to the performing of the course-of-action patterns observed. He thus ascribes to this fictitious consciousness a set of typical notions, purposes, goals, which are assumed

to be invariant in the specious consciousness of the imaginary actor-model. This homunculus or puppet is supposed to be interrelated in interaction pattern to other homunculi or puppets constructed in a similar way. Among these homunculi with which the social scientist populates his model of the social world of everyday life, sets of motives, goals, roles--in general, systems of relevances--are distributed in such a way as the scientific problems under scrutiny require.²⁰

Schutz outlines four postulates which are to govern the scientific construction of the "puppets" and "the model of the social world."

1. The postulate of logical consistency demands that the fictitious consciousness be compatible with the principles of formal logic; that is, its conceptual constructs are to be clearly and distinctly defined and it is to be compatible with the principles of formal logic. Such is an important feature of scientific thought as opposed to everyday common thought.

2. The postulate of adequacy implies that the scientific model of human action should be understandable to the actor on the social scene. It seems that this postulate is incompatible with the above for in order for the everyday actor to understand the scientific model he must be conversant with scientific thought and formal logic. Such would at least require a short course in phenomenological sociology in which case the everyday actor would have a biased opinion of why he acts in certain ways--that is, if the everyday actor could be persuaded to accept phenomenological teachings.

3. The postulate of subjective interpretation requires the scientist to ask "what model of an individual mind can be constructed and what typical contents must be attributed to it in order to explain the observed facts as the result of the activity of such a mind in an understandable relation."²¹ We have already critically dealt with this as-

sumption in Chapter III and, therefore, see no reason to be redundant.

4. The postulate of rationality is as follows:

The ideal type of social action must be constructed in such a way that the actor in the living world would perform the typified act if he had clear and distinct scientific knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate means for the realization of the most appropriate ends.²² (emphasis not in original)

In order to discuss generally Schutz's "puppets" let us locate his theory within the philosophical and sociological debate of "operationalism" vs. "realism".²³ The distinction between the two is based upon their existential claims about the world: "operationalists" theoretically account for the world in terms of hypotheticals and analogies whereas "realists" claim to talk about "what is". Although Schutz at times seems to be a peculiar "realist" in treating consciousness as the only "objective" reality, he is primarily an operationalist. Indeed, phenomenology rests on hypotheticals. The result of such a theory and a methodology is that it assumes relationships between theory and fact, between, specifically in Schutz's case, mind and behavior, which have yet to be proven because it can not be proven within its own framework.

The deficiency of operationalism, then, is that it blurs the distinction between theories and models, between analogies which state that phenomena behave as if they were the visible outcome of some underlying mechanism or quasi-mechanism, and theories which maintain that the phenomena behave as they do because they are the visible outcome of such and such a mechanism.²⁴

With Schutz there is the added hypothesis concerning the existence of the visible. What we have been calling Schutz's "theory" is, according to the above, a model.

Models and theories alike assist us to fill in causal sequences by showing how one thing follows from another; but the weakness of models relatively to theories is precisely that they only have a heuristic usefulness, they

do not tell us that this is the sequence which really takes place.²⁵

Schutz's model, like many models in the social sciences, is an analytic model which as such generates no experiments which would empirically prove its truth. Although Schutz does encourage social scientists to constantly re-arrange the fictitious consciousness of their "puppets" to fit observed behavior, they can make no claims, other than on an introspective and subjective basis, about the factual relationship between action and the activities of the "mind".

Footnotes - Chapter IV

¹ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 5.

² See John Hospers, Op. cit., pp. 115-116.

³ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 5.

⁴ See page 26 of this thesis.

⁵ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 5.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 6.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 74-80.

¹⁰ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 120.

¹¹ For a provocative introduction to viewing man as an integral part of nature see Lyall Watson's Super Nature: a Natural History of the Supernatural. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973.

¹² Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 309-310.

¹³ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 61.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 348.

¹⁵ Lyall Watson, Op. cit., p. 159.

¹⁶ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 26.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁸ Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 13.

¹⁹ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 11.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 63-64.

²¹ Ibid., p. 43.

²² Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 86.

²³ See Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London:

Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1970, pp. 76-97.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 94.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 96.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND REMARKS

A. Summary

1. The philosophy of phenomenology was shown to be illogical mainly on the grounds that it presupposed that questions of how one knows govern what one knows, when logically, in fact questions of how one knows assumes that one knows. Commonly we employ "how" questions in order to verify what one knows and we sometimes, but not always, find that the methods employed have led us to erroneous, or at least suspect, factual claims. Phenomenologists base their theory on the merely logical possibility that all statements about the world are in this manner suspect and, therefore, man can have no empirical knowledge of the world. Phenomenologists have universalized particular cases of doubt to conclude that man can only know his "self". It is within phenomenology that we find the original mistake which has led some sociologists, such as Alfred Schutz, to take up the problems of the "subjective" interpretation of reality, "intersubjectivity", mind and body, and the "social" construction of "reality".

2. In Schutz's theory of action the mind is portrayed as being composed of happenings and occurrences which cause occurrences in the outer world, bodily movements. Accepting for the time being Schutz's mind-body dichotomy, I have alternatively argued that the mind could be described as socially dispositional. It is concluded that both these accounts of the mind are accurate accounts of partic-

ular cases, both of which can be explained more fully when we incorporate man's interrelationship with nature in producing his livelihood. Related to this discussion is Schutz's contention that "things", social and material, refer to the activities, mental and bodily, of the men who produced them. Such reference ignores the "things" themselves (e.g., wood, metal or bureaucracies, organizations).

3. In Chapter IV Schutz's argument calling for different methods, because qualitatively different subject matter, in the social and natural sciences is discussed. It is dispensed with on the grounds that (1) it is phenomenologically biased, and (2) if we consider the life sciences as providing a more adequate paradigm for social science than the physical sciences, then the difference in subject matter is only one of degree. Schutz's prescribed methodology for the social sciences, i.e., ideal types, "puppets", models of the social world, is shown to have only heuristic value, if any.

B. Phenomenology as Ideology

This thesis began with a critical examination of the philosophy of phenomenology, followed by an examination of Schutz's theory of action and behavior which, apart from intrinsic problems, assumed the validity of phenomenology. Schutz's theory of science assumed the validity of both phenomenology and his theory of behavior. On the whole, then, we can see that the crux of Schutz's phenomenological sociology is phenomenological philosophy, so let us return and make a few relevant comments about it.

It seems that one must always be skeptical about a philosophy that is contrary to the sense, albeit unrefined sense, of the common

working man, especially in regard to the independent existence of the physical world. Those persons who interact directly with the physical world and who depend on it directly for their livelihood (all people do depend on the existence of it only some more directly than others) are not easily persuaded to treat the physical as non-existent or even as irrelevant. The onus, therefore, is on the philosopher to show just and logical reason for disregarding the existence of the physical. In the second chapter it was shown that phenomenologists have not done so, hence, any system of thought based on phenomenology becomes absurd.

It is apparent that there is something more than just space and/or time which separates the working man from the philosopher, and that something is in their respective relationships to the physical world which some philosophers conveniently treat as irrelevant. It is a well known fact that Schutz was a full-time banker and corporate executive and a part-time philosopher.¹ It is not difficult to see that in both positions Schutz was abstracted from the physical world, and, thus, it was relatively simple, if not necessary, for him to view the physical and the "life world" of others with composed detachment. Schutz, however, had many friends and proteges who not only revered him but influenced him and were in turn influenced. It is not too difficult to surmise that these persons, occupying the same sort of positions relative to the physical world, agreed with his ideas at least in principle if not in detail. Schutz, then, was the copious spokesman for a large group or class of privileged persons who occupied powerful and dominant positions within the system of Euro-American capitalism.

Although this argument is not as cogent or substantial as it could be--it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make it so--it does,

coupled with this thesis, provide sufficient grounds for treating Schutz's ideas as ideological. Such could be the topic for another thesis which would entail treating Schutz's ideas as a social product of the German-American theoretical tradition and its origin and propagation in the socio-economic-political conditions of the age.²

C. Sociology and the Appeal of Phenomenology

It has recently become abundantly clear, thanks to Gouldner in this respect, that sociology is in a crisis, due to, on the one hand, the ideological underpinnings of mainline, or Parsonian, sociology, and on the other hand, the revolutionary sociology of Marx. Not wishing sociology to be ideological or revolutionary, wanting it instead to be some sort of 'objective' science, sociologists have gone searching for alternatives. Seeing phenomenology as non-ideological and innocuous, because superficially it just describes and typifies common-sense, has led some to join the phenomenological movement. Others who consider themselves 'radical', anti-establishment, have also joined the movement characterized by John Horton as having "charismatic leaders, possessed followers, and a language which only insiders pretend to understand."³

Restless graduate students, tired of traditional mystifications, are finding in phenomenology a refreshing alternative to main-line sociology. The alternative embodies Husserl's criticism of positivism: it is not scientific enough; operating within the natural attitude it uncritically accepts the conventional social reality as an objective reality.⁴

William Mayrl similarly elaborates:

Certainly the appeal of social phenomenology does not lie in its idealism but rather in its apparent ability to get at something which seems lacking in objectivist analyses with their deductive systems or their historical dialectics. Social phenomenology claims to be able to get at the blood and guts of human existence....The major appeal of

this school is that it seems immediately and concretely human.⁵

The move to the school of phenomenological sociology is, then, due, as well, to its humanistic face and its reaction to the onesidedness of mainline sociology which, having reified society, leaves little room for innovative human actions. Unfortunately, its appeal is inappropriate for it is radically 'other-sided' leaving no room for an objective socio-economic order to influence people's actions or accounts of their actions, and, like its predecessor, ignores the role of man's struggle with nature and himself in shaping those accounts. What is required, obviously, is a universal synthesis of all these various influences on human thought and behavior, a difficult task which is, 'surprisingly', beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, as Alan Ryan pointedly concludes, "there is a world of difference between setting out to do something very difficult, and setting out to do something which makes no sense."⁶ However, for numerous historical, economic and human reasons, many sociologists have been fettered to partial explanations and have consequently failed to recognize that the massive and, thus, enigmatic, synthetic framework has already been provided by Karl Marx, among others.

D. Educators and Phenomenological Sociology

For educators there is an added attraction to phenomenology: knowledge, socially organized and distributed, is elevated to the status of determinant, that is, what we know or believe determines our actions. Schutz states:

Only a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experience. The greater part is socially derived, handed down to me by my friends, my par-

ents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers. I am taught not only how to define the environment,.... but also how typical constructs have to be formed in accordance with the system of relevances accepted from the anonymous unified point of view of the in-group. This includes ways of life, methods of coming to terms with the environment, efficient recipes for the use of typical means for bringing about typical ends in typical situations.⁷

The institution of education then plays an important role in inculcating the members of a group with values and attitudes which, according to Schutz's theory of behavior and action, will shape their behavior. Furthermore, knowledge, i.e. attitudes, values and beliefs, and education are seen as both creating and therefore solving social problems. Consider the following:

(It) can be stated that both the problem of formal equality in terms of abolishing discrimination, and the problem of material equality in terms of minority rights, originate in the discrepancy between the objective and subjective definition of a concrete group situation.⁸

Quite another question is that of the strategy by which the evil of social tension can be at least diminished. This educational goal can in my opinion be reached only by a slow and patient modification of the system of relevances which those in power impose upon their fellow-men.⁹

What Schutz implicitly calls for is that the "objective" definition of the situation should give way to the "subjective"; that the "Other" should not impose his interpretation of the situation upon an-Other, and hence, social tensions will diminish. (Characteristically, Schutz ignores "the situation", not wanting to 'impose' his definition upon "Others".) The resulting prescription for education is a 'free' school where each 'individual' pupil is 'free', or perhaps obliged, to follow the dictates of his 'own' consciousness and 'do-his-own-thing'. The establishment of such schools we have already seen, and quite clearly Schutz's conceptions of man in his world, can be used to justify and

promote such schooling practices. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to criticize such practice,¹⁰ but what this thesis has shown is the philosophical faults with his concept of 'man' and the anti-societal implications of such philosophizing for sociology and so for sociology of education.

It is hoped that this thesis will be used as a basis for a re-analysis of some phenomenological sociologists of education such as Michael Young, et al, and Paul Filmer, et al.¹¹

Footnotes - Chapter V

¹ See Barry Hindess, 'The 'Phenomenological' Sociology of Alfred Schutz' in Economy and Society, VI. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972, p. 19; and also Richard M. Zaner 'Introduction' to Alfred Schutz's Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970, p. xxii.

² See 'Appendix 1: Biographical Notes on Alfred Schutz' in this thesis.

³ John Horton 'The Fetishism of Sociology' in Radical Sociology, Jack Roach and David Colfax (eds.). New York: Basic Books, 1971, p. 187.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ William Mayrl, Op. cit., pp. 27-28.

⁶ Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, pp. 240-241.

⁷ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 13.

⁸ Alfred Schutz, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 266.

⁹ Ibid., p. 262.

¹⁰ For critiques of 'free schooling' see The Failure of Educational Reform in Canada, Douglas Myers (ed.). Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1973; and for a critique of the theoretical positions underlying 'free' schooling see Herbert Ginitis, 'Towards a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society', in the Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, February, 1972.

¹¹ Paul Filmer, et al, (eds.). New Directions in Sociological Theory. London: Collier - MacMillan Publishers, 1972.

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APPENDIX 1

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON ALFRED SCHUTZ

(1899 - 1959)

Born in Austria, Alfred Schutz attended the University of Vienna where he studied law and social science under Ludwig von Mises, Othmar Spann, Hans Kelsen, and Fredrich von Wieser. It became his life's aim to establish the philosophical foundations of the sciences of man as conceived by Max Weber and in the current German academic opposition to naturalism. Such led him to encounter the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl whom he met after the German publication in 1932 of The Phenomenology of the Social World. Husserl, impressed with Schutz's scholarship, invited him to become his assistant which Schutz declined for personal reasons (probably foreseeing invasion of Austria by Nazi Germany and intending to leave the country). Schutz, however, corresponded with Husserl until the latter's death.

Arriving in New York City in 1939 after a one year stay in Paris, Schutz embarked upon two careers. First, he remained throughout his life in association with a banking firm in Austria where he had held a responsible position, and, as well in America, he simultaneously held positions as an executive in different corporations. Secondly, he was initiated into American academic circles by Marvin Farber becoming a member of the International Phenomenological Society and a member of the editorial board of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. In 1943 he was appointed lecturer and in 1952 named a full-professor in

the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research in New York. Here he found friends, Dorian Cairns and Aron Gurwitsch, who had also studied with Husserl, thus providing an arena of discourse and enabling him to more fully develop a phenomenological philosophy for the social sciences. Schutz, then, combined his banking and corporate work with his academic duties and writings; as Aron Gurwitsch says "Schutz's familiarity with the social sciences and with social reality proved highly fruitful for his work in philosophy proper."¹

On May 20, 1959, Alfred Schutz died in New York City survived by his wife, Ilse, his son, George, and his daughter, Evelyn.²

Footnotes - Appendix 1

¹ Aron Gurwitsch, "Alfred Schutz (1899 - 1959)", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1959, Vol. 20, pp. 141-142.

² For more information concerning Schutz's intellectual development in Europe and America see the above note (1) and the following: H. L. van Breda's "Preface" to Schutz's Collected Papers, Vol. I, op. cit.; Richard M. Zaner's "Introduction" to Schutz's Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, op. cit.; and The New York Times' "Obituaries", May 23, 1959, p. 25, col. 5.

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